Eyeing and grasping the other's intentions: When inferring another's acts affects our own attention by Nuku, P.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/40161
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Eyeing and grasping the other’s intentions:
when inferring another’s acts affects our own attention
Pines Nuku
Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information
All experiments were carried out at the Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Infor-
mation, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
ISBN 978-90-9022847-1
Cover design and typographic layout by the author.
c© by Pines Nuku. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced
in any form without permission from the author.
Printed by PrintPartners Ipskamp, Enschede, The Netherlands.
RADBOUD UNIVERSITEIT NIJMEGEN
Eyeing and grasping the other’s intentions:
when inferring another’s acts affects our own attention
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J Kortmann,
volgens besluit van het College van Decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 8 mei 2008
om 09.30 uur precies
door
Pines Nuku
geboren op 31 maart 1976
te Shkode¨r, Albanie¨
Promotor:
Prof. dr. H. Bekkering
Beoordelingscommissie:
Prof. dr. Ruud Meulenbroek
Prof. dr. Jay Pratt (University of Toronto, Canada)
Dr. Martin Fischer (University of Dundee, Scotland, UK)
Contents
1. Introduction 1
1.1. Action understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Theories of action understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Action understanding: goals and agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Action understanding and joint attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5. Gazing and joint attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6. Understanding the other’s hand actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.7. Issues and outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
I. Eyeing other’s intentions 15
2. Joint attention:
Inferring what others perceive (and don’t perceive) 17
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2. Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3. Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4. General discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3. When one sees what the other hears:
Crossmodal attentional modulation for gazed (and non-gazed) upon au-
ditory targets 31
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2. Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3. Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4. Experiment 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.5. General Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
II. Grasping other’s attention 47
4. Joint attention in action observation:
Inferring another’s action intentions modulates visual attention 49
4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2. Experiment 1a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
v
Contents
4.3. Experiment 1b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4. Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.5. General discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5. Grasping another’s intention:
Purposeful actions attract attention 63
5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2. Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.3. General Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6. Epilogue 73
6.1. Gaze and hand signals in social cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.2. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Bibliography 79
Nederlandse samenvatting 89
Pe¨rmbledhje ne¨ shqip 95
Dankwoord 99
Curriculum Vitae 101
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1 Introduction
This chapter is based on: Nuku, P. & Bekkering, H. (in press). How do we
understand other’s intentions? An attentional investigation. In Striano, T. &
Reid, V.M. (Ed.), Social Cognition: Development, Neuroscience and Autism.
Oxford: Blackwell.
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1.1. Action understanding
Humans have a great desire for social interaction. Thanks to the ability of
shaping their own behavior with that of the interacting partner, humans adapt
quickly to different social situations (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Blakemore
& Frith, 2005). The present work sheds some more light on the mechanisms
that allow for this behavioral accommodation, showing that both observing and
inferring another’s behaviour modulates the observer’s behaviour already at an
early attentional level.
The first chapter introduces the relevant concepts and definitions for the the-
sis. Based on the existing literature, it shows how the observation of another’s
behaviour affects the observer’s motor response. The following four chapters,
based on own studies, offer a deeper description of the role played by two of
the most informative signals, namely gaze and hand actions, in modulating the
observer’s attention response. The thesis concludes with discussing the new
insights in the light of social cognition.
1.1. Action understanding
A widely accepted view on the process of understanding others’ actions suggest
that perceiving another’s action activates the observer’s corresponding motor
program. This proposal emerged originally in Lotze’s (1852) theory of local signs
that assumes that space perception arises from the combination of a qualitative
map of visual sensation and a quantitative map of metrics for fovealizing the
object (for an historical overview see Scheerer, 1984). In 1890, William James
made this proposal available to the general scientific public under the heading of
ideomotor theory. The theory holds that every action representation awakens,
to some degree, the actual movement that comes with it.
Modifications to the theory by Greenwald’s (1970) ideomotor compatibility
suggest that the representation of an event that follows a given action evokes the
same action in the observer. According to Schmidt’s schema theory of motor
learning (1975) actions are not stored as specific movements. Instead, humans
construct generalized motor programs and abstract relationships or rules about
movement. Every time a human performs a certain action he or she gathers
four distinct pieces of information: the initial conditions (starting of the action),
aspects of the action (e.g., speed), the results of the action (e.g., the outcome),
and the sensory consequences of the action (e.g., how it felt). Relationships
between these four items of information are used to construct a recall schema
and a recognition schema. The recall schema is based on initial conditions and
the results and is used to generate motor programes that may address a new
goal. The recognition schema is based on sensory actions and the outcome.
The connection between action observation and execution is further developed
by Prinz’s (1990) common coding framework suggesting that perceiving other’s
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and planning own actions relies on common structural mechanisms. In other
words, actions are represented in the form of ‘images’ of the sensory feedback
they produce, and such representations are used to initiate and control body
movements. From the ideomotor perspective observing a person executing an
action leads to the activation of an internal motor representation in the observer,
because the observed action is similar to the content of the equivalent motor
representation. This way, the preactivated motor representation can be used to
imitate the observed behaviour. Hence, the ‘ease’ with which humans imitate is
due to the general organization of motor control rather than a special purpose
mechanism dedicated to imitation (see Brass & Heyes, 2005). Guided by the
ideomotor principle, Brass, Bekkering, and Prinz (2001) showed that when asked
to lift either the index or the middle finger in response to either images of
similar finger tapping or to symbolic cues, subjects’ finger lifting was facilitated
when cued by the other’s finger lifting, but not by the symbol appearing on the
(other’s) stationary finger. This finding suggests that the mere observation of
other’s actions affects the execution of own movements.
1.1.1. The neural basis of action understanding: the “mirror
neurons”
Several studies stress the existence of a ‘direct matching’ system, according to
which action understanding results from mapping other’s observed actions onto
one’s own motor representations of that same action (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi,
& Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fo-
gassi, & Gallese, 2001). According to these studies, action understanding is
embodied within a neural system - the mirror neuron system - that is active
both when one executes an action as well as when one attends another per-
son carrying out that action (see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004 for a review).
Neurophysiological (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992;
Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Hari, Forss, Avikainen, Kirveskari,
Salenius, & Rizzolatti, 1998; Nishitani, & Hari, 2000; Strafella, & Paus, 2000;
Umilta`, Kohler, Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, Keysers, Rizzolatti, 2001), brain imag-
ing (Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Decety, Grezes, Costes, Perani,
Jeannerod, Procyk, Grassi, & Fazio, 1997) and behavioral (Brass, et al., 2000;
Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Wohlschlager, & Bekkering, 2002)
studies support this assumption. In addition, direct evidence for mirror neuron
existence among humans has also been supplied. In 1995, Fadiga and colleagues
recorded a muscle in the hand of subjects while they watched movements ei-
ther involving the recorded muscle. Watching movements involving the muscle
while receiving transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in the the motor cortex
corresponding to the recorded muscle, resulted in greater motor-evoked poten-
tials than watching movements not involving the recorded muscle (see for other
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evidence: Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 1999;
Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Tremblay, Robert, Pascual-Leone, Lepore,
Nguyen, Carmant, Bouthillier, & Theoret, 2004).
1.1.2. The neural basis of action understanding: the superior
temporal sulcus
The mirror neuron system consists of a fronto-parietal circuit with strong con-
nections to the superior temporal sulcus or the STS (Rizzolatti, & Craighero,
2004). Typically, STS responds to biological motion in general (Beauchamp,
Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2003) and to that the motion of dynamic body parts in
particular (Puce & Perrett, 2003). The area is also active when one observes
the interaction between a hand and an object, or when one observes a posture
following a specific action. Interestingly, the STS is also involved in the process
of inferring other’s action intentions (Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004).
1.2. Theories of action understanding
According to the direct matching hypothesis other’s action are understood (by
the observer) because their “. . . observation causes the motor system of the ob-
server to ’resonate’ . . . ” (Rizzolatti et al., 2001, p. 661), and also because we
“. . . internally simulate them . . . ” (Gallese et al., 2004, p. 396).
Several theories try to explain the basis of action understanding. The in-
teraction theory (Gallagher, 2001) assumes that action understanding is part of
being human, and that humans are ‘prone’ to interacting with one another. The
associative learning theory (see Schultz & Dickinson, 2000), on the other hand,
suggest that action understanding derives from connecting causal and predictive
structure of the environment by associating actions with action outcomes. Hu-
mans learn to understand other’s behaviour by incorporating the unexpected:
erroneous outcomes on others’ actions expand the expectation on other’s be-
haviour, facilitating the understanding of that same action in the future.
Two contrasting approaches, however, dominate the discussion on action un-
derstanding: the theory theory and the simulation theory. The theory-theorist
imagines a ‘veritable’ theory used to reason about others’ minds. Theory theory
sees action understanding in terms of theoretical stances. Other’s mental states,
desires and actions, are represented as theoretical posits with causal laws relat-
ing external stimuli to one’s inner states. People acquire and use knowledge
from daily interaction, thus accessing another’s behaviour requires accessing
one’s own internal repertoire of possible actions, and consequently inferring the
action being performed by the other (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994).
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The simulation theory, on the other hand, suggests that action understanding
is not merely theoretical. According to Goldman’s view (1989), simulating minds
deal with the process of attributing first-person mental states to third-persons.
In this view, simulation is a predominantly detectivist model of self-knowledge.
It uses inner sense, or self-monitoring, and postulates an introspection-based
code that is used to represent concepts like desire, belief, pain, or fear. Accord-
ing to Gordon’s (“radical”) version of the simulation theory (1986; 1995), the
capacity for simulation is necessary for the very capacity to perceive objects as
mind-endowed. Only those who simulate can understand another’s beliefs and
only those that can understand other’s beliefs can simulate.
Interestingly, Heal’s (1986) proposal on the topic argues in favor of a hybrid
theory connecting the simulation theory and the theory theory. According to the
author both theories - independently from whether they focus on causal laws of
other’s behavior (theory theory) or the analogical transforming of first-person
accounts into third-person accounts (simulation theory) - rely on inferential
mechanisms.
In terms of processing, simulation occurs mainly in two ways. The first one
regards the condition when a person comes to know her own and others’ minds
through the ‘ascent routine’ (Gordon, 1995). Alternatively, one can simulate
by putting oneself in another’s shoes or by extrapolating the mental experience.
Furthermore, from a cognitive viewpoint, simulation is a role-taking activity,
with one’s own behavior being employed as a manipulable model of another’s
behavior without the actual behavior taking place. From a neurocognitive view-
point, simulation is an automatic (unconscious) activation in response to an
observed behavior (Hurley, 2004).
In sum, humans use their own mental mechanisms to predict the other’s be-
haviour by generating - not necessarily performing - actions similar to the ob-
served ones. Most of the motor theories that typically bridge the gap between
motor cognition and mindreading do endorse the simulation account (but see
Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005 for an alternative view). They show that humans
read other people’s minds (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Chaminade, Meary, Or-
liaguet, & Decety, 2001; Knoblich & Flach, 2001) and understand the aboutness
of their intentions by simulating them. Furthermore, they suggest that simula-
tive mechanisms are vital to communicatve processes like imitating linguisting
(see Rizzolatti, & Arbib 1998; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Arbib, 2002; Gallese &
Lakoff, 2005) and non-linguistic (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) interaction.
1.3. Action understanding: goals and agency
There is a large consensus on that one’s actions are understood in terms of
the goals represented by the action. According to the goal-directed theory of
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imitation (Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, & Gattis, 2002) a typical action goal is
the (physical) target for reaching and grasping. Furthermore, a goal can also
be defined as the representation of the functional mechanism underlying action
planning (Koski et al., 2002), a mental state representing one’s desires (Travis,
1997), or an action mediated by instrumental knowledge of the causal relation-
ship between the action and the action outcome (Dickinson & Balleine, 2000).
In our studies, a goal refers to the outcome of an action performed by an animate
agent, where animacy refers to ‘living’. In other words, a goal-directed action
will refer to an action, with a clear purpose, performed by an animate human
agent. Furthermore, and in line with Tomasello’s view (1995) who defines goals
as anthithesis to means, the thesis distinguishes between means (i.e., eyes and
hands) and goals (i.e., gazing and grasping).
1.4. Action understanding and joint attention
Representing intentional relations is crucial to action-understanding (Tollefsen,
2005). A direct way to generate, and consequently access these representations,
is through the so-called joint attention. Joint attention coordinates the behavior
of agents by ‘connecting their minds’ (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006),
and by simulating their goals (Deak, Flom, & Pick, 2000). In order to detect
the other’s goal, the observer focuses on a particular feature of the other’s body,
and aligns to it (Tomasello, 1995). Thus, action understanding through joint
attention occurs both by directly observing the other’s motor behaviour (e.g.,
if one sees another person entering a supermarket one assumes that the other
needs to buy something) and by inferring the other’s region of interest (e.g., if
one sees another agent looking attentively toward a specific object one infer that
the object is of great interest for the agent). Joint attention requires the eval-
uation of another’s perspective (Hobson, 2002). For example, when observing
another’s action - be it gazing or pointing - one does interpret the agent’s eyes
and hands as means while the agent’s gazing and grasping is perceived as as
goals of the event (Woodward & Guarjardo, 2002). In the following paragraphs
the existing literature illustrating the role played by eyes and hands in facilitat-
ing the understanding of specific human actions will be combined own studies
illustrating the act of orienting one’s own attentional system as a consequence
of both perceiving and inferring another’s actions.
1.5. Gazing and joint attention
Knowing whether one is the recipient of another’s gaze can be decisive in many
social situations. Similarly, orienting to the locus of another’s attention alerts
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one on the situation or the object attended by the other agent. Such alerting
refers to the process of allowing the mental state of the observed individual to
be constructed by the observer. The process is driven by the sophistication
of human social interaction where deception and cooperation are daily prac-
tice (Tomasello & Call, 1997). At least by the age of three months, human
infants display maintenance (and thus recognition) of eye contact. However,it
is not until nine months that children begin to exhibit gaze following, and not
until eighteen months that children will follow gaze outside their [fb01]eld of
view (Baron-Cohen 1995). Gaze following is an extremely useful imitative ges-
ture which serves to focus the child’s attention on the same object that the
caregivers attending to. This simplest form of joint attention is believed to
be critical for social scaffolding (Thelen & Smith 1994), development of theory
of mind (Baron-Cohen 1995). This functional imitation appears simple, but a
complete implementation of gaze following involves many separate proficiencies.
In fact humans are particularly good at processing the multiple meanings com-
ing from the gaze. Humans have learned that one’s eyes tell something about
the bearer’s identity (Bruce & Young, 1986), emotional expression (Ekman,
1982), intentions (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and
even mental state (Kleinke, 1986). While most of the dyadic communication
(between two interacting agents) requires the two individuals to have a prior
knowledge of each-other’s attention (shared attention), often one individual uses
the other’s gaze as a cue for inferring the other’s attention (joint attention). A
theoretical model explaining the role of gaze cues as mean for joint attention
has been proposed by the Baron-Cohen’s mindreading approach (1995). Ac-
cording to it there are four mechanisms that explaing the social importance
of eye and gaze direction. For example the intentionality detector interprets
motion in terms of mental states, goals and desires, the eye direction detector
detects eyes and interprets their direction as a seeing act, These two detec-
tors are involved in a dyadic (between an agent and an object or between two
agents) while the shared-attention-mechanism. The two remaining detectors,
the shared-attention-mechanism and theory of mind, allow for triadic (e.g., two
agents attending at the same external object) representations.
1.5.1. The morphological constraints of gaze cueing
The morphology of the primate’s face in general and that of the humans in
particular, is very peculiar. Humans have prominent and high cheekbones, con-
spicuous nose and eyebrows framing the eyes. These features are developed
to highlight the region around the eyes (the eyebrows), to move the eyes (the
cheekbones and related musculature), signal the direction of attention (gaze and
nose direction), and aid communication via facial expressions (Huber, 1961). In-
terestingly, although the direction of another individual’s attention is easier to
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establish from larger visual cues, such as one’s head, smaller features, such as
one’s eyes seem a better indicator of others’ attended location (Perrett & Emery,
1994). This precision might partially rely on the eye morphology: the contrast
between the dark iris/pupil and the white sclera and the larger part of the eye
consisting on the sclera at either sides of the dark central iris (Kobayashi &
Kohshima, 1997). Interestinly, only humans, and none of the other apes, have
this white sclera. That’s why humans seem to use another individual’s eye mor-
phology not only with the purpose of aligning with events in the environment,
but also for detecting the other’s goals (Kleinke, 1986; Baron-Cohen, 1995).
1.5.2. The physiological bases of gaze cueing
Several studies have shown that the direct observation of eyes within a human
face photograph (Driver et al., 1999; Langton & Bruce, 1999) or within the
depiction of a face (Friesen & Kingstone 1998) facilitate the observers’ atten-
tion. Moreover, while bearer’s head orientation affects the processing of its
gaze direction, behavioural (Hietanen, 1999; Langton, 2000), neurophysiological
(Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992), and brain imaging studies (Bentin,
Allison, Puce, Perez, McCarthy, 1996) evidence in favour of a stronger eye di-
rection. Functional imaging studies (Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, &McCarthy,
1996; Haxby, Ungerleider, Clark, Schouten, Hoffman, & Martin, 1999), lesion
(Campbell, Heywood, Cowey, Regard, & Landis, 1990) and neuropsychological
(Vuilleumier, 2000) data suggest that gaze is likely processed in the superior
temporal sulcus and in the amygdala. While the (anterior) STS mediates gaze
processing (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Haxby et al., 2000; Schuller & Ros-
sion, 2001) and is directly involved in gaze perception (Wicker, Michel, Henaff,
& Decety, 1998; Kawashima, Sugiura, Kato, Nakamura, Hatano, Ito, Fukuda,
Kojima, & Nakamura, 1999), the amygdala is crucial in attributing significance
to the eyes (Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003). That is why gaze is perceived as
an informative (indicating one’s direction of attention) as well as an emotional
(indicating threatening and/or friendly reactions) cue.
1.5.3. Detecting (other’s) mental state and (other’s) gaze cueing
The human cognitive system is specialized in human gaze perception (Baron-
Cohen, 1995), and one of the aims of social cognition is to understand how we
infer and understand the mental states of other people. In social cognition,
particular attention has been given to human faces and gazes. Faces indicate
one’s emotional states and intentions (Leary, Britt, Cutlip, & Templeton, 1992)
while gaze indicates the bearer’s attention (Emery, 2000; Langton, Watt, &
Bruce, 2000). Although humans might not be fully able to infer the others’
intentions, they do use each other’s facial expression, in general, and gaze, in
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particular, to communicate their emotions and convey information about their
intentions. Plausibly, the ability develops during infancy. Newborns seem to
prefer looking at faces that engage in mutual gaze (Farroni, Csibra, Simion,
& Johnson, 2002), while 3 month old infants align their attention with the
direction of another person’s gaze direction (Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998)
and 4 month old infants discriminate between direct and averted gaze (Farroni,
Johnson, & Csibra, 2004). Aligning with another’s gaze is probably reflexive.
Studies show that knowing an object is more likely to appear at one’s non-
gazed side as compared to the gazed side, cannot prevent the observer from
orienting toward the gazed side (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone,
2004). Interestingly, while at first glance the reflexiveness of the orienting toward
another’s gaze direction might seem non-adaptive, it actually is a key factor to
the process of establishing a strong pattern for social interaction (Moore &
Dunham, 1995). Not surprisingly that orienting one’s own attention activates
the same neural areas involved in decoding the meaning of gaze (Emery, 2000;
Kingstone, Friesen, & Gazzaniga, 2000). Furthermore, deficits in decoding the
meaning of gaze (like in the case of of people with autism syndrome) cause a
reduced sensitivity to gaze orientation as well as joint attention (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Roeyers, Van Oost, & Bothuyne, 1998).
1.6. Understanding the other’s hand actions
An increasing number of behavioral studies suggest that the perceptual and the
motor systems interact at many levels. Observing an action facilitates the per-
formance of similar actions (Brass et al., 2001) interfer with the performance of
different actions (Kilner et al., 2003). Several studies show an overlap between
motor behaviour and action understanding (Iacoboni et al., 1999). Interestingly,
there are studies showing that the potential for action is recognized and mod-
ulate the observer’s attention (Handy et al., 2003; Downing et al., 2004). The
involvement of the motor systems in action observation suggests that observers
interpret other people’s actions by simulating the actions in their own motor sys-
tem (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). A growing wealth of data suggests that specific
areas in the human brain, such as the inferior frontal gyrus and the superior tem-
poral sulcus (Johnson-Frey, Maloof, Newman-Norlund, Farrer, Inati, Grafton,
2003), are involved in processing information relevant to social communication,
including goal-directed hand actions (for reviews: Puce & Perrett, 2003). For
example, humans have a striking capacity to predict actions performed by their
conspecifics by simulating the others’s observed actions (see Wilson & Knoblich,
2005 for a review). These shared representations are grounded in sensorimotor
interactions (Sommerville & Decety, 2006) and consist of a link between action
and perception (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 1998). Performing
10
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a goal-directed movement leaves behind a bidirectional association between the
motor pattern and the sensory effects it produces, and this association aids the
retriving of action by anticipating its effects (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard,
2005). The common perception-action codes are accessible during action obser-
vation and the mere perception of an action activates an action representation
to the degree that perceived and represented actions become one (Sommerville
& Decety, 2006).
1.6.1. Joint attention and hand postures
Similarly to gazing, performing a certain hand actions is facilitated by viewing
a congruent hand movement performed by another agent (Brass et al., 2000;
2001; Stu¨rmer et al., 2000; Kilner et al., 2003; Craighero et al., 2002; Vogt et
al., 2003). The observation of human postures does not only activate visual
areas, but also neural structures involved in motor planning and execution of
the very same actions (Fadiga et al., 1999; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Fourkas et al.,
2006). Observing another agent grasping (Fadiga, et al., 1995; Brass, et al.,
2001; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins,
2003; Blakemore & Frith 2005) or pointing (Brass, et al., 2000; Stu¨rmer, et
al., 2000) affects the observer’s motor behaviour. While there is little doubt on
the action-perception system, it remains to be seen wether the observation of a
motor act does affect the observer’s attention.
In the following chapters, this thesis evidences how other’s acts do facilitate
the observer’s deployment of attention. Furthermore, we will show that spatially
directed (seemingly) intentional postures have attentional consequences for the
observer, and that this action-attention system reflects the inferred, rather than
the observed, action intentions of other individuals.
1.6.2. The experimental design
A widely used experimental desing for studying the deployment of attention
has been derived by Posner’s cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980). Here, a target
appears in one of two locations and the observer reports whether the target
appeared or not. Prior to the presentation of the target, a stimulus (the cue)
primes the probable location of the target. If the cue does correctly indicate
the target location (i.e., valid cued trials) the observer’s performance, measured
with response times and accuracy, is better than if the cue does not indicate it
(i.e., invalid cued trials). This result led Posner (see also Posner & Peterson,
1990) conclude that the cue enhances the processing of events appearing at such
cued location, orienting the observer’s attention.
Visuo-spatial attention to a certain location may vary depending on whether
the target appears with or without warning (Posner, 1980; Jonides, 1981). In-
11
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ternally generated (endogenous) orienting may occur when the subject shifts the
focus of attention because of interpreting the information provided by the cue.
For example, when we see the sign ‘left’ (the cue) in an airport hall we interpret
it as a direction sign, and we follow it if our destination (target) concides with it.
This type of orienting is often refered to as top-down, voluntary, or goal-driven
orienting. Externally generated (exogenous) orienting, on the other hand, is
elicited by an abrupt change in luminance (e.g., a flash, a noise, a movement) at
the periphery of the observer’s visual space. Since the cue does not require inter-
pretation, this type of attention orienting is referred to as bottom-up, reflexive,
or stimulus-driven orienting. In contrast, orienting evoked by endogenous cues
can be voluntarily suppressed if the information conflicts with the task demands.
That is, while one might be able to ignore the information implicit in an arrow-
head, one can hardly ignore the abrupt appareance of a sound. This difference
distinguishes the two types of cues, suggesting that orienting to central cues is
less automatic than orienting to peripheral cues (Jonides, 1981)1.
A second difference distinguishing the two cueings regards their time-course
properties (Reuter-Lorenz, Jha, & Rosenquist, 1996). Typically, when a target
appears within 100 msec following an exogenous cue, target detection is facili-
tated, whereas when the same target is presented 300 msec after the cue, target
detection is inhibited (although after a few hundred milliseconds the facilita-
tion can occur and last for 3-5 seconds). This early-facilitation-late-inhibition
or inhibition of return (IOR) is present mainly in exogenous cueing. In con-
trast, in endogenous cueing, when the target appears within 100 msec following
a valid cue, target detection is not facilitated. However, at longer cue-target
intervals, it is also not inhibited [but see Weger, Abrams, Law, and Pratt (in
press) showing that endogenous cues can produce inhibition of return]. In other
words, endogenous cueing is slower, but more resistant (longer lasting) than the
exogenous cueing (see Posner, 1988).
The cueing pattern (e.g., reflexivenes versus interpretation; early facilitation
versus late inhibition) applies to social cues too, but then in a different pat-
1The dichotomy between exogenous and endogenous orienting can be alternatively explained
in terms of probability. It is generally accepted that uninformative peripheral cues generate
exogenous shifts of attention. Such shifts are thought to be reflexive and quickly initiated,
producing facilitatory effects at short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) and IOR at long
SOAs. Informative central cues generate endogenous shifts that are thought to be under
some amount of volitional control, are slower to be initiated, and produce long-lasting
facilitatory effects without any IOR. In other words the attention is “pulled” exogenously
toward a peripheral cue and “pushed” endogenously in the direction indicated by a central
cue. However a new class of cues, the uninformative central cues, proposed by Hommel
and colleagues in 2001 does not fit into either category. Rather, they have characteristics
of both exogenous shifts (one’s attention is involuntarily initiated), and endogenous shifts
(the deplyyment of attention is slow but longlasting). (see for similar effects Pratt, &
Hommel, 2003). Biologically relevant cues (such as eyes) seem to fit more this cueing
category.
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tern. Gaze and hand cues show both exogenous (reflexive) endogenous (in-
terpretative) cueing properties. For example, gaze-evoked orienting show that
the cueing effects builds up gradually, resembling that of endogenous cueing,
while, in line with exogenous cueing, they cannot be voluntary suppressed (see
Frischen & Tipper, 2004). Even when observers know that a target is more
likely to appear at the non-gazed location, observing another’s gaze direction
triggers the observer’s attention reflexively toward the gazed location (Driver
et al., 1999; Kingstone, 2002; Tipples, 2002). Such a cueing pattern does not
apply to gaze only but it is typical to deictic pointing (Langton, et al., 2000) and
grasping hands (Fischer & Szymkowiak, 2004). For example, Fischer, Prinz, &
Lotz (in press) have shown that the cueing effect derived from grasping hands
arises already before 300 msec after the cue onset, suggesting that hand obser-
vation triggers the observer’s attention in a more exogenous like modality (see
Craighero et al., Vogt et al., 2003 for similar effects in motor response).
Considering this literature the thesis adopts a simple cueing paradigm, with
centrally presented social cues priming visual or auditory targets. In all the
studies, the cue direction was unpredictive and the to-be-detected target ap-
peared randomly at one of the two possible locations. The core of the thesis
was testing whether the observation of social cues does trigger the observer’s
attention, and whether such attention orienting is the result of aligning with the
observed cue direction or the result of inferring the bearer’s intentions.
1.7. Issues and outline
The present thesis is organised in two experimental parts. The first part (Chap-
ter 2 and Chapter 3) deals with gaze cueing. It investigates whether the process
of observing another’s gaze direction can be more than merely aligning with
another’s eye direction, and shows that target detection is enhanced by both
observing and inferring another’s region of interest. The second part (Chapter
3 and Chapter 4) deals with the question of whether observing another’s hand
posture facilitates the observer’s attention. It shows that observers anticipate
the action outome, by inferring the goal-directedness of the observed posture.
The last chapter of the thesis integrates the findings, and discusses them in the
light of social cognition.
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Part I.
Eyeing other’s intentions

Chapter 2
Joint attention
Inferring what others perceive (and don’t perceive)
2 Joint attention
Abstract. Research has shown that observers automatically
align their attention with another’s gaze direction. The present
study investigates whether inferring another’s attended location
affects the observer’s attention in the same way as observing their
gaze direction. In two experiments, we used a laterally oriented
virtual human head to prime one of two laterally presented tar-
gets. Experiment 1 showed that, in contrast to the agent with
closed eyes, observing the agent with open eyes facilitated the ob-
server’s alignment of attention with the primed target location.
Experiment 2, where either sunglasses or occluders concealed the
agent’s eye direction, showed that only the agent with the sun-
glasses facilitated the observer’s alignment of attention with the
target location. Taken together, the data demonstrate that the
head orientation alone is not sufficient to trigger a shift in the
observer’s attention. Additionally it showed that gaze direction
is crucial to this process, and that inferring the region to which
another person is attending does facilitate the alignment of at-
tention.
This chapter is based on: Nuku, P., & Bekkering, H. (in press).
Joint attention: Inferring what others perceive (and don’t per-
ceive). Consciousness and Cognition.
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2.1. Introduction
Several studies have explored the role of gaze cueing in visual attention. For ex-
ample, it has been shown that humans reflexively align their gaze direction with
other conspecifics, and that this alignment is closely linked to attentional pro-
cesses. Gaze following has been shown to be present already in infants as young
as 3 months old (Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998), and to persist in adulthood,
with adults reflexively directing their attention toward targets falling within
another’s gaze direction (Driver, Davis, Ricciardelli, Kidd, Maxwell, & Baron-
Cohen, 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1989; Hietanen, 1999; Langton & Bruce,
1999). Eyes are considered crucial in triggering these attentional shifts, because
they naturally attract the observer’s attention even if they are irrelevant to
the task (Downing, Doods, & Bray, 2004). Remarkably, gaze processing seems
to remain intact even when the ability to process head related information is
severely impaired (Campbell, Heywood, Cowey, Regard, & Landis, 1990). Fur-
thermore, gaze processing and attention orienting seem to activate the same
brain areas, suggesting that a similar cortical mechanism may underlie both
processes (Dolan, Fink, Rolls, Booth, Holmes, Frackowiak, 1997).
A typical paradigm used for investigating gaze cueing uses a centrally pre-
sented human head facing the observer and priming the upcoming target by
orienting the eyes either toward or away from the target location (Driver et
al., 1999). The observers are required to (manually) respond to the presence of
targets presented at either side of the head. If responses are shorter when the
other’s eyes are directed toward the target location, it is assumed that observing
the other’s gaze direction has facilitated the observer’s attention. A slight mod-
ification to this paradigm, introduced by varying both head and gaze direction
(Hietanen, 1999; Langton, 2000), indicates that the context in which the eye
orientation is varied might be crucial to gaze processing (Iter, Villate, & Ryan,
2007). For example, some studies suggest that eye and head orientation are
processed separately (Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000), or that they are equally
influential in modulating the observer’ attention (Hietanen, 1999). Other stud-
ies, on the other hand, suggest that sensitivity to gaze direction is impaired
when the eyes are embedded in a natural versus a scrambled head (Campbell et
al., 1990; Vecera & Johnson, 1995), and that eye direction might be a ‘contam-
inating factor’ for gaze judgments (Doherty & Anderson, 2001) creating some
uncertainty around the (separate) role played by eye and head. Surprisingly,
this uncertainty extent also to the role played by the observers’ inferential pro-
cesses regard another’s gaze direction. To date, no studies can unequivocally
show whether the observer’s alignment of attention is a consequence of observ-
ing the other’s gaze direction or whether it is a consequence of inferring the
others attended location. This dissociation is of crucial importance since gaze
direction provides information, such as the gazer’s identity (Bruce & Young,
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1986), emotional (Ekman, 1982), mental states (Kleinke, 1986), and intentions
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). Furthermore, gazing
is crucial to joint attention, the process of sharing one’s experience by follow-
ing another’s gaze, which enables humans learn to communicate by interpreting
each other’s gaze direction (see Tomasello, 1995).
Considering the social relevance of understanding and aligning with another’s
gaze direction, the aim of this study was to find further evidence showing that
gaze cueing is more than just spatial alignment. More specifically, we investi-
gated whether there is a difference between observing an agent physically gazing
at the target location and inferring the agent as physically being able to attend
the target location. Given that in joint attention one ‘tunes’ own attention
with another agent, the prediction here was that the observer’s attention would
benefit if the agent was believed as attending to the object. Two experiments
tested these predictions. Experiment 1 investigated the alignment of one’s own
attention in response to observing the other’s eyes direction while experiment 2
investigated the alignment of one’s own attention as a consequence of inferring
the agent as attending the object of interest.
2.2. Experiment 1
Here, the prime, a static 3-D depiction of the head depicted as slightly oriented
toward the left or right side of the screen with either closed or open eyes, cued
the location of an upcoming visual target. The experiment aimed at showing
whether observing an agent’s head with open eyes might trigger the observer’
attention differently from observing an agent’s head with closed eyes. In other
words we compared the reaction times to target onset in both conditions when
the prime appeared with the eyes open and closed.
2.2.1. Method
Participants
Fourteen undergraduate psychology students with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, naive to the purpose of the study, took part in the experiment for a pay-
ment of 5 Euro or for credit points.
Stimuli, design and procedure
The prime, a 3-D greyscale picture depicting a human-like head measuring 10◦
(degree in visual angle) by 8◦ (see Figure 2.1), was centrally presented on a
regular 17-in. computer screen placed approximately 60 cm in front of the
seated participant. The eye region subtended approximately 2◦. Two balls,
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Figure 2.1.: The experiment started with the presentation of a fixation cross, followed 700
msec. by a 150-msec long cue (the agent’s head with opened eyes or closed eyes). The
imperative target (red dot) appeared 50-, 200-, or 500-msec after the prime onset. The star
here represents the target onset. This figure illustrates a valid trial with the target appearing at
the same (left) location as the one indicated by the head direction. The complete experimental
design comprised right side valid trials, as well as left and right side invalid trials..
measuring 2◦ were simultaneously displayed 15◦ to the right and the left of
the head prime. The target consisted of the colour change (i.e., from yellow
to red) of one of two lateral yellow balls, and a single key press measured its
detection. Each trial started with the simultaneous presentation of a central
fixation cross and two lateral balls. After 700 msec the head, with either open
or closed eyes, was displayed for the duration of 150 msec. Following one of
the three randomly chosen delay intervals (Inter Stimulus Interval, or ISI, of
50 msec 200 msec, and 500 msec) the target appeared either at the right or at
the left ball. The prime and the target remained visible until either a response
was given or 2000 msec had elapsed from the target onset, whichever came first.
Participants were explicitly informed that eyes were presented either closed or
open. Additionally, they were told that target would equally appear at either
side of the head prime. The experiment started with 10 practice trials, followed
by 200 experimental trials consisting of 90 valid, 90 invalid trials as well as 20
catch trials that together with the three delay intervals controlled for random
responses.
2.2.2. Results
Erroneous responses (anticipations or response given before the target onset,
missing responses, early responses with reaction times faster than 100 msec, and
late responses with reactions times longer than 800 msec, false alarms or response
to catch trials) accounted for less than 2% of all trials, and were excluded from
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the statistical analysis. Correct data point were submitted to an analysis of
variance (MANOVA), with Prime Type (head with closed eyes, head with open
eyes), and Validity (valid trials or trials where the head direction was congruent
with the target location, and invalid trials or trials where the head direction was
incongruent with the target location), and ISI (50, 200, 500 msec), as within-
subject factors. In terms of main effects, the analysis showed that only the
ISI factor was significant F (2, 12) = 11.7, p < .05, indicating that overall the
reaction times decreased at longer ISI intervals. Given that the average response
to targets primed by the head with eyes open (374 msec) and the head with eyes
closed (371 msec) was similar, Prime Type proved not significant F (1, 13) < 1,
p > .05, as did Validity F (1, 13) = 1.9, p > .05. Importantly, however, Validity
interacted with Prime Type F (1, 13) = 8.7, p < .05, indicating that the cueing
pattern —the difference between valid (367 msec) and invalid (381 msec) trials,
t(13) = −2.9, p = .013—in the eyes open condition was significantly different
from the cueing pattern—the difference between valid (370 msec) and invalid
(372 msec) trials t(13) = .40, p > .05—in the eyes closed condition (Figure 2.2).
Although Validity did not significantly interact with ISI (F < 1), further post
hoc analyses showed that the lack of this interaction was mainly due to the
eyes closed condition. A series of paired sample t-tests comparing valid and
invalid trials for each ISI interval in either Prime Type condition showed that,
in the open eyes condition, responses to valid trials were significantly faster than
responses to invalid trials in the shorter ISI 50 msec t(13) = 2.1, p < .05, and
ISI 200 msec t(13) > 2.2, p < .05, but not in the longer ISI 500 msec interval
t(13) < 1, p > .05. In contrast, in the eyes closed condition, the difference
between responses to valid and invalid trials was significant only for the longer
500 msec ISI interval t(13) = 3.2, p < .05, where responses to validly primed
trials were inhibited with respect to the invalidly primed trials. The three-
way interaction between Prime Type, Validity, and ISI proved not significant
(F < 1).
2.2.3. Discussion
Consistent with the existing literature, the current data showed that observers
respond significantly faster to targets cued by agents who are capable of gazing
towards a target location (i.e., agents with the eyes open). Interestingly, they
also showed that the observation of the agent’s head with the eyes closed did not
facilitate the observer’s attention. This latter finding is novel in the gaze-cueing
literature, suggesting that gaze-cueing relies on the agent’s eye direction, and
that only by directly observing another’s eye direction does one orient his/her
own attention with the gazed target.
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Figure 2.2.: Panel 1 illustrates the observer’s responses as a function of Validity and Prime
Type. Here, the cueing effect was larger for trials with the head cue appearing with open
eyes than for the ones where the head cue appeared with closed eyes. Panel 2 illustrates
the responses as a function of Validity and Delay Intervals (SOA), showing that overall the
observer’s responses decreased with the increase in the prime-target interval.
2.3. Experiment 2
Although, at a first glance it seems that observers align their attention (with
another’s gaze) only when the agent’s eyes are open one can alternatively argue
that only an agent with open eyes can attend while an agent with closed eyes
cannot. Thus, observers might have focused on the agent’s attended location,
rather than follow their eye direction.
In order to test whether inferring the agent’s region of interest, rather than
aligning with the agent’s eye direction, might indeed facilitate the observer’s
attention, we ran a second experiment where we controlled the confound between
open eyes and attending. Here, we presented the agent wearing either concealing
sunglasses, through which one can look/attend, or concealing occluders, through
which one cannot look/attend (see Figure 2.3). We made two straightforward
predictions. First, if observing the agent’s eye direction is imperative in aligning
the observer’s attention, neither the sunglasses nor the occluders should affect
the observer’s attention. Second, if observers align with the agent’s eye direction
because they infer the agent’s attended region of interest, only the agent with
sunglasses should affect the observers’ attention.
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Figure 2.3.: With the exception of the agent’s eye being obstructed by either occluders or
sunglasses, the experimental design was identical to that of Experiment 1. The experiment
started with the presentation of a fixation cross, followed 700 msec. by a 150-msec long cue
(the agent’s head with sunglasses or occluders). The imperative target (red dot) appeared 50-,
200-, or 500-msec after the prime onset. The star here represents the target onset. Subjects
were required to respond to its appearance.
2.3.1. Method
Participants
Fourteen undergraduate psychology students with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and naive to the purpose of the study took part in the experiment for a
payment of 5 Euro or for credit points.
Stimuli, design and procedure
With the sole exception of the eyes region being concealed by either obstructing
sunglasses or obstructing occluders, matching each other in colour (i.e., dark
gray) and size (i.e., 7◦ by 3 ◦), this experiment was identical to the previous one
(see Figure 2.3).
2.3.2. Results
Errors (anticipations, missing responses, false alarms, and early/late responses)
accounted for less than 3.1% of all trials, and were excluded form the analysis.
Latencies on correct trials were subjected to an analysis of variance with Prime
Type (head with sunglasses, head with occluders), Validity (valid trials, invalid
trials) and ISI (50, 200, 500 msec) as within-subject factors. The analysis showed
a main effect for ISI F (2, 11) = 41.7, p < .05, indicating a decrease in reaction
times as the cue-target intervals increased. Prime Type and Validity did not
24
2.3. Experiment 2
e
y
e
s
 w
it
h
 o
c
c
lu
d
e
rs
 
  
  
  
v
a
li
d
 
  
  
  
in
v
a
li
d
 
e
y
e
s
 w
it
h
 s
u
n
g
la
s
s
e
s
 
  
  
  
v
a
li
d
 
  
  
  
in
v
a
li
d
 
R
T
’s
 i
n
 m
s
e
c
. 
360 
365 
370 
375 
380 
385 
390 
395 
400 
invalid valid 
s
u
n
g
la
s
s
e
s
 
o
c
c
lu
d
e
rs
 
Validity 
50 ms 500 ms 200 ms 
340 
355 
370 
385 
400 
415 
430 
R
T
’s
 i
n
 m
s
e
c
. 
ISI 
Panel 1 Panel 2 
Figure 2.4.: Panel 1 illustrates the responses as a function of Validity and Prime Type. It
shows that the cueing effect was larger for the trials where the agent appeared with sunglasses
than for the trials where the agent appeared with occluders. Panel 2 illustrates responses as a
function of Validity and Delay Intervals (ISI). It shows that the response times decreased with
increasing prime-target intervals, but only in the sunglasses condition where the responses to
valid trials significantly faster than responses to invalid trials.
reach significance (both F < 1). Importantly, however, they interacted with
each other F (1, 12) = 7.9, p < .05, indicating that the cueing pattern—responses
to valid (379 msec) trials being faster than responses to invalid (394 msec)
trials t(13) = −2.2, p < .05—in the sunglasses condition was different from the
cueing pattern—responses to valid (382 msec) trials being similar to responses
to invalid (381 msec) trials t(13) = .60, p > .05—in the occluders condition
(see the left panel in Figure 2.4). In order to further explore this data we ran
two separate ANOVA’s for each Prime Type with Validity and ISI as within-
subject factors. In the occluder condition the analysis showed a significant
main effect for ISI F (2, 12) = 26, p <.05, with response times decreasing as
the prime-target interval increased. Since responses to valid trials (382 msec)
were virtually identical to responses to invalid trials (381 msec), the main effect
of Validity, as well as the Validity and ISI interaction, proved not significant
(both Fs < 1, both ps> .05). In contrast, the same analysis the sunglasses
condition showed a main effect for ISI F (2, 12) = 16, p < .05, and for Validity
F (1, 13) = 4.7, p <.05, with the latter indicating that responses (376 msec) to
valid trials were significantly faster than responses (390 msec) to invalid trials.
Further explorative post hoc t-tests showed that the main effect of Validity was
mainly due to the shorter ISI 50 msec t(13) = 2.2, p < .05, and ISI 200 msec
t(13) = 2.3, p < .05 intervals while the longer ISI 500 msec interval t(13) = .90,
p > .05, did not contribute to this effect (see the right panel in Figure 2.4).
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Since this experiment dissociated between the cueing effects derived from
the head with sunglasses and the head with occluders, and since the previous
experiment dissociated between the cueing effects derived from the head with
closed eyes and the head with open eyes, we compared these two dissociations
statistically. For each Prime Type of either experiment (i.e., head with: eyes
open, eyes closed, sunglasses and occluders) we subtracted the RTs in valid tri-
als from the RTs in invalid trials, and created a new variable called Inference
Type, which captured the ‘net’ cueing for each prime type. Inference Type had
two levels: inferable primes included the head with the eyes open and the head
with sunglasses (allowing observers to infer the agent’s attended location), and
non-inferable primes included the head with the eyes closed or the head with oc-
cluders (not allowing observers to infer the agent’s attended location). The data
points derived from this subtraction were entered into an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with Inference Type (inferable, non-inferable) as a within-subject
factor, and Experiment (Experiment 1, Experiment 2) as a between-subject fac-
tor. Interestingly, the main effect of Experiment proved not significant (F < 1)
while the main effect of Inference Type was significant F (1, 25) = 10.2, p < .05,
suggesting that the cueing benefit derived from observing the head with open
eyes (+16 msec) and the head with sunglasses (+14 msec) was statistically dif-
ferent from the cueing costs derived from observing the head with closed eyes
(+2 msec) and the head with occluders (-6 msec). This finding was indirectly
confirmed by the lack of interaction between Inference Type and Experiment
F (1, 25) < 1, p > .05.
2.3.3. Discussion
The second experiment showed that, when agent was wearing the sunglasses,
observers responded significantly faster to primed targets than to unprimed
ones.When the agent was presented with the occluders hiding the eyes region,
the observer’s responses were not facilitated. Since the agent’s eyes were equally
obstructed in both conditions, the cueing difference cannot be attributed to the
process of aligning one’s attention with another’s observed gaze direction, but
rather it suggests that inferring another’s attended location affects the observer’s
attention1.
1In order to test whether the sensitivity toward the head with sunglasses and the head with
occluders was similar to each other, we run a short experiment testing whether observers
can distinguish in a similar manner the orientation of the two agents. Thus, we presented
a group of 10 subjects the 3-D picture of the agent with the eyes region obstructed by the
occluders and to another group of 10 subjects the 3-D picture of the agent with the eyes
region obstructed by sunglasses. The agent’s head was, in both conditions, oriented to the
left side. We asked subjects to (verbally) report whether the agent was more likely to be
oriented (a) ‘to the left’, (b) ‘to the right’, or (c) ‘I don’t know’. We found that 10 out of
10, in the sunglasses condition, and nine out of ten (χ2(1) = 6.4, p = .01), in the occluder
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2.4. General discussion
Three major findings arose from our investigation on how observing and in-
ferring others’ attended region of interest affect the observer’s attention. First,
consistent with previous research our study showed that observing another’s eye
direction modulates the observer’s attention. Second, it provided new empirical
evidence on that observing (laterally oriented) heads with closed eyes does not
trigger the observer’s attention. Third, and most importantly, it showed that
inference processes do affect the observer’s attention: when the agent’s eyes
are obstructed, but the observer has grounds to believe that the agent can still
look/attend toward a certain location, the alignment of the observer’s attention
with the agent’ attended region of interest is facilitated.
Regarding the first two findings, the dissociation between eye and head orien-
tation is an important issue within the gaze-cueing literature. As early as 1824,
Wollaston demonstrated that small changes of nose orientation in face drawings
can alter the perception of head orientation (cited in Bruce & Young, 1986),
and similar studies (Anstis, Mayhew, & Morley, 1969; Iter et al., 2007; Lang-
ton & Bruce, 1999; Langton, Honeyman, & Tessler, 2004; Ricciardelli, Baylis,
& Driver, 2000; Wilson, Wilkinson, Lin, & Castillo, 2000), have shown that
‘gaze-cueing’ can be separated into ‘eye’ and ‘head’ cueing components. For
example, Hietanen (1999) has shown that observing an agent’s laterally averted
gaze within a profile head elicits fast orienting of visual attention, whereas see-
ing the head in profile with an observer-congruent gaze does not. The author
suggested that observers use information about the other’s gaze direction in rela-
tion to the head orientation. Similarly, when Langton (2000) asked participants
to make speeded key press response based on either the agent’s gaze or head
orientation, he found that, in contrast to (head-gaze) congruent arrangements,
incongruent arrangements resulted in slowed responses to both gaze and head
cues. This suggested that a mutual interference arises from the independent
influence that gaze and head orientation have on decisions concerning another’s
social attention. Since the current gaze cueing literature has mainly focused
on the congruent–incongruent eye–head dychotomy, failing to fully answer the
question of whether the observer’s attention might be modulated by another’s
head orientation alone, the present study is the first one to directly test the ef-
fect of observing another’s head with closed eyes and show that head orientation
alone does not affect the observer’s attention.
This finding is in line with the classical stimulus-based interpretation, ac-
cording to which socially relevant primes are processed both exogenously and
condition, reported the agent as oriented toward the left side. Considering this finding, we
are confident that the subjects’ accuracy in estimating the agent’s orientation was similar
for both agent types, and that detecting the orientation of the agent with occluders was
not more difficult than detecting the orientation of the head with sunglasses.
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endogenously, with the exogenous component attracting the observer’s atten-
tion at an early stage, and the endogenous like component directing it even at
a latter stage. In other words, at short ISI intervals both primes (e.g., the head
with eyes open; the head with eyes closed) facilitated the observer’s alignment,
whereas at long ISI intervals, the observer’s responses were either inhibited, like
in the case of the head with the eyes closed, or absent, like for the head with
the eyes open.They suggest that, in order to comply with the task, participants
might have made use of interpretative-based strategies: gazing has social mean-
ing and its function can be represented (people wearing sunglasses can look even
though we do not see their eyes). Thus, it is not surprising that one can effi-
ciently infer where the other is attending. For example, Doherty and Anderson
(2001) required participants to sort photographs of laterally oriented faces with
obscured eyes into two piles according to whether participants estimated the
agent to be looking to the left or to the right. Since the participants’ responses
where in accordance with the authors’ prediction, the authors concluded that
one might indicate another’s gaze direction even in ‘the absence of gaze turns’
(Doherty & Anderson, 2001, p. 766; for a similar conclusion see Wilson et al.,
2000).
The second contribution of the present study is that it provides clear empirical
evidence regarding the ability of humans to infer another’s attended location and
rely on it. It shows that inferring is beneficial only when applied to meaningful
circumstances (e.g., like when observing an agent with sunglasses), but not to
meaningless ones (e.g., like when observing the agent with closed eyes or opaque
occluders).
As earlier mentioned, interacting partners constantly focus on each other’s
gaze direction because they are intrinsically driven to infer each other’s next
moves (Tomasello, 1995). This perceptual coordination, or joint-attention frame-
work (Tomasello & Haberl, 2003), develops early in the human life, with 9-
month-old infants using declarative pointing to establish communication with
others. For example, when one reacts to the infant’s pointing by either looking
at the object or at the infant herself, the infant express dissatisfaction. How-
ever, when one reacts by looking back and forth from the object to the infant,
the infant seems satisfied because she could share the attention with another
agent (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004). This ex-
ample illustrates a typical triadic engagement involving the infant, the adult,
and an object toward which both agents seem to aim. Additionally, it illustrates
how gaze following is critical to this engagement, with ones’ looking becoming
increasingly coordinated with the agent’s attention.
Interestingly, however, humans do also engage with objects that they cannot
perceive (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). It has been shown
that when the agent’s gaze is directed toward an object that is not visible to
the infant, the latter does not merely attend the barrier occluding the object,
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but aim for the out-of-sight object behind it (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Moll
& Tomasello, 2004). Thus, social interactions moves from focusing on another’s
gaze direction to focusing on another’s intention.
In sum, the present study showed that one’s attention is modulated by the
observation of gaze direction and by inferences derived from this observation.
This finding suggests that interacting agents pay as much attention to each
other’s observable acts as they do to each other’s intentions. It seems like
humans do continuously observe, intrinsically infer, and spontaneously orient to
the conspecifics’ attended region of interest.
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Chapter 3
When one sees what the
other hears
Crossmodal attentional modulation for gazed (and
non-gazed) upon auditory targets
3 When one sees what the other hears
Abstract. Three experiments investigated the nature of visuo-
auditory cross-modal cueing in a triadic setting: participants had
to detect an auditory signal while observing another agent’s head
facing one of the two laterally positioned auditory sources. The
first experiment showed that when the agent’s eyes were open,
sounds originating at the agent’s eyes side were detected faster
than sounds originating at the agent’s ear side. When the eyes
were closed, however, sounds originating at the ear side were de-
tected faster than sounds originating at the eyes side. To further
test whether subjects had been processing the eye/ear relation
to the target or whether they have processed the action/function
related to these stimuli, we run a second experiment with the
ear taken away from the head, and a third experiment, with the
ear hidden under either a ‘solid’ helmet or a ‘transparent’ hat. In
addition to confirming the earlier cross-modal visuo-auditory cue-
ing, Experiment 2 and 3 showed that observing another agent’s
ears and eyes is important though not crucial for aligning the
observer’s attention. Selectively inferring an agent as (visually or
auditorily) attending at a certain location does facilitate the ob-
server’s visuospatial orienting. The findings are discussed in the
context of simulation processes and joint attention mechanisms.
This chapter is based on: Nuku, P., & Bekkering, H. (under
review). When one sees what the other hears: Crossmodal at-
tentional modulation for gazed (and non-gazed) upon auditory
targets. Acta Psychologica.
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3.1. Introduction
Imagine that you are chatting with a colleague about your boss’s new knockoff
Armani suit. While conversing, your colleague gazes to your right where the
voice of your boss is now, suddenly, clearly audible. In such a situation, you
could orient yourself to what your colleague is saying, but more likely, you will
try to catch the reaction of your boss to determine whether he was privy to
these sensitive comments. This example illustrates one of the most ordinary
and complex human activities: synthesizing information coming from auditory
and visual channels with the aim of producing an appropriate response. The
aim of the present study is to investigate the nature of cross-modal (visuo-
auditory) orienting in a triadic (i.e., observer-object-agent) or joint attention
setting where one’s own (auditory) attention is facilitated by observing another’s
gaze direction.
Typically cross-modal orienting requires participants to detect auditory (i.e.,
sounds) and visual (i.e., light) targets that have been preceded by visual and
auditory primes respectively. Cross-modal cueing is typically investigated using
classical “spatial-cueing” paradigms (Posner, 1980) where the onset of a prime
in one modality facilitates the detection of a stimulus in another modality (e.g.,
Schmitt, Postma, & De Haan, 2000; McDonald, Teder-Salerjarvi, & Hillyard,
2000; for a review, see Spence & Driver, 2004). For example, in audio-visual
crossmodal cueing, occurring in both covert (Spence & Driver, 1994; 1997) and
overt orienting (Reisberg, Scheiber, & Potemken, 1981; but see Wolters & Schi-
ano, 1989), the presentation of a sound does not only enhance the perceptual
processing of subsequent visual stimuli (Driver & Spence, 1998), but it also facil-
itates the motor responses to visual stimuli appearing at the location nearby the
auditory source (McDonald & Ward, 2000). Similarly, in visuo-auditory orient-
ing, the presentation of visual cues facilitates the detection of auditory targets
(Gopher, 1973; Rorden & Driver 1999; Mazza, Turatto, Rossi, & Umilta`, 2006).
Whereas there is little doubt that changes in luminance facilitate the detection
of nearby auditory stimuli, it is still unclear whether observing a more compli-
cated visual stimulus, such as another’s gaze, might also facilitate the observer’s
attention toward the location of auditory targets. Head and eye orientation are
often considered as special reflexive attention-triggering primes, because the eye
morphology (i.e., sclera-to-iris ratio) seems to have evolved with the purpose of
allowing easy discrimination of one’s attended location (Kobayashi & Kohshima,
1997). Several studies have shown that, in unimodal orienting, gaze direction
triggers the observer’s visual attention reflexively. Infants align preferentially
with other’s eyes (Vecera & Johnson, 1995; Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998; Hen-
derson, Williams, & Falk, 2005; Firestone, Turk-Browne, & Ryan, 2006), while
adults fixate on another’s gaze direction even when they know that the gaze
is unpredicitve (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Hietanen, 1999; Langton & Bruce,
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1999; 2000; Emery, 2000) or counterpredictive (Downing, Dodds, & Bray, 2004;
Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004). Furthermore, observing another’s gaze
plays a crucial role in social interaction and joint attention.
Although joint attention is sometimes defined as the “. . . to spontaneously
direct attention to where someone else is looking” (Kingstone, Friesen, & Gaz-
zaniga, 2000, p. 159), more appropriately it refers to a triadic process whith the
eye direction being a reliable indicator of the co-actor’s intentions (Tomasello,
Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). It is not surprising that individuals with
deficits in social abilities, likethe case of people with an autistic spectrum disor-
der, do not only lack the ability of understanding and interacting with other’s
intentions (Baron–Cohen, O’Riordan, Jones, Stone, & Plaisted, 1999), but are
also less sensitive to gaze processing (Pelphrey et. al., 2003).
Considering the crucial role of (another’s) gazing in both visuo-spatial ori-
enting and social interaction, the aim of the present study was twofold. First,
we shed some light on whether gaze cueing affects visuo-auditory orienting. We
investigated observation of another agent’s gaze (here the visual prime) looking
toward the location of the upcoming sound (here the auditory target) would
facilitate the observer’s visuospatial attention toward the auditory target lo-
cation. Secondly, because the observation of meaningful actions performed by
others may automatically activate the observer’s motor and cognitive repertoire
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti,
2004), we investigated whether similar inferential and simulative mechanisms
might also account for crossmodal visuo-auditory interactions.
3.2. Experiment 1
The experiment, adopting the spatial-cueing paradigm of Bayliss and Tipper
(2005), investigated whether the observation of another’s gaze direction toward
a sound location facilitates the observer’s detection of that same sound. In a
triadic (observer-object-agent) setting with the participants representing the ob-
server, the 3-D depiction of the static human-like head representing the agent,
and the auditory target representing the external object, the observers observed
the agent’s head orientation and were required to manually detect the sounds
propagating from either the gazed or non-gazed location. We predicted that
observing the agent gazing the upcoming target location would facilitate the
observer’s target detection while observing the agent orienting away from the
target location would not. In line with our previous study (see Chapter 2)
showing that observing agents gazing toward visual cues triggers the observer’s
attention, we predicted that the same cueing would apply to this cross-modal
setting. In other words, we predicted that attentional facilitation would be the
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strongest when observing the agent gazing toward the auditory location, whereas
observing agents with theirs eyes closed would not facilitate the observer’s at-
tention.
3.2.1. Method
Participants
Sixteen participants (five males; mean age 22 years), all students from the Uni-
versity of Nijmegen, received either course credits or five Euro for their partic-
ipation at the experiment. All had normal (or corrected-to-normal) vision and
hearing, and all of them were right handed. They were naive as to the purpose
of the experiment.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The visual prime was presented on a flat-screen PC (100HZ) and consisted on
3-D greyscale representation of a human head, oriented 45◦ to the right (in
50% of the trials) and 45◦ to the left (50% of the trials) side of the screen and
having the eyes either open (50% of the trials) or closed (50% of the trials). The
head measured approximately 10◦ (degree in visual angle) by 8◦. The auditory
targets propagated from one of the two speakers positioned, at head level at an
eccentricity of 56◦ to the right and 56◦ left of the central fixation (see Figure
3.1). The sounds were created by a white-noise generator (100 dB), and lasted
110 msec. Thus, in order to prevent observers from representing the space in
terms of ‘left-to-fixation’ or ‘right-to-fixation’ we added at an eccentricity of 24◦
to the left and right of the fixation cross two additional non-functional speakers.
The design lead observers to believe that the target could propagate from each
of four speakers, reinforcing our instruction that trying to anticipate the target
location could not be derived by ‘luck’ alone.
Design
The combination of the two within-subject factors, Head Orientation (head ori-
ented 45◦ toward the speaker, head oriented 45◦ away from the speaker), and
Gaze Type (eyes open, eyes closed) created head congruent trials (the target
propagated from the head primed location) and head incongruent trials (the
target propagated from the head unprimed location). Since observers were told
to ignore both the head orientation and the eye region, the crucial information
in this experiment would be derived by the head congruent condition where the
reactions to targets primed by the head with the eyes open would be compared
with the reactions to targets primed by the head with the eyes closed.
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Figure 3.1.: Each trial began
with a fixation cross (2000-msec)
followed by the head prime (150-
msec). After one of the three pos-
sible delay intervals (SOA) of 50-
, 150-, or 500-msec the auditory
target appeared randomly from
either the left of right speaker for
the duration of 110 msec. In Ex-
periment 1 the agent’s ear was
fully visible.
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Experiment 1 
Participants received a block of 15 practice trials, followed by 260 experimental
trials of which 40 were catch trials (no target was presented, and no response
was expected).
Procedure
Each trial started with a fixation cross, presented for 2000 msec, followed by
the prime, the agent’s head. The prime was presented as oriented to the left
(in 50% of the trials) or to the right (50%), with its eyes open (in 50% of the
trials) or closed (50%). After a variable interval of 200, 300, or 650 milliseconds,
introduced to discourage random and/or anticipatory responses, a 110 msec.
long sound propagated from either the (56◦ to the) right speaker (in 50 % of all
trials) or from the (56◦ to the) left speaker (50%). The head prime remained
visible on screen until either a response was given or 2000 msec. had elapsed,
whichever came first.
Participants sat in a dimly lit, soundproof room, with their body midline
positioned 60 cm from the centre of the computer screen. They were reminded
to constantly fixate the central fixation1 on the screen and told that each trial
would begin with the presentation of an agent trying to align her attention with
the left or right target location. They were told that the agent’s attempts would
be at chance level since the target was unpredictable and could appear with
equal probability either from the two leftmost or the two rightmost speakers.
1Although the eye fixation was monitored by the experimenter only, we are confident that
the participants complied with the instructions to fixate in the center of the screen, since in
fast detection tasks participants do spontaneously avoid making eye movements to target
locations (see Posner, 1980). Additionally, cross-modal capture of attention has been shown
to occur even when controlling for gaze fixation (van der Lubbe & Postma, 2005), thus an
eventual contribution of overt orienting (if any) here would not affect our hypothesis (i.e.,
that the observer’s attention can be affected by auditory signals).
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Figure 3.2.: The lower part of the fig-
ure illustrates the mean reaction times for
Experiment 1. It shows that when the
agent’s eyes were open, auditory targets
propagating from the eye side were de-
tected faster the targets propagating from
the ear side. When the eyes were closed
the targets propagating from the eye side
were detected slower than the targets
propagating from the ear side. The upper
part of the figure illustrates the combina-
tion of the (head) congruent/incongruent
targets with closed/opens eyes.
Participants were instructed to fixate at the agent’s eye region, ignore the agent’s
head orientation, and press the response button as soon as they heard the sound.
3.2.2. Results
Trials in which errors (e.g., omissions, anticipations, and false alarms) occurred
(3.8%) and in which RT’s were either too fast (RT < 100 msec) or slow (RT >
800 msec), (1.4%) were removed from the analysis. The remaining data points,
contributing to means for each participant, were submitted to a repeated mea-
sure ANOVA, with Head Orientation and Gaze Type as within-subject fac-
tors. Although neither main effect reached the significance level (both Fs <
1), crucially, Head Orientation and Gaze Type did interact with each other
F (1, 15) = 6.4, p <.05 (see Figure 3.2). This means that the response pat-
tern to the eyes open condition [i.e., responses to ‘head congruent target’ trials
(209 msec) being faster than responses to ‘head incongruent target’ trials (214
msec), t(15) = 2.0, p = .056] was significantly different from the response pat-
tern to the eye closed condition [i.e., responses to ‘head congruent target’ trials
(219 msec) being slower than responses to ‘head incongruent target’ trials (209
msec), t(15) = 2.3, p < .05]. No other factor, or combination of factors, reached
the significance level.
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3.2.3. Discussion
In this experiment we investigated whether observing another agent oriented
(with eyes open and with eyes closed) toward an external auditory stimulus
would facilitate the observer’s attention toward the gazed upon target. We
showed that a (visuo-auditory) cross-modal orienting exists: observing the visual
depiction of an agent with open eyes facilitates the detection of auditory targets
originating from the agent’s eyed side. Additionally, and in line with previous
findings, we showed that observing a laterally oriented head with closed eyes
does not trigger the orienting of the observer’s attention. Furthermore, when
the agent’s eyes were closed, the observer’s responses were facilitated when the
auditory sound propagated from the agent’s ear side.
3.3. Experiment 2
In addition to demonstrating the existence of cross-modal orienting in joint
attention, Experiment 1 confirmed previous findings (Tipples, 2002) showing
that visual cues other than the human eyes modulate the observer’s attention.
Thus, in Experiment 2 we investigated whether (or not) the presence of other
face features, namely the agent’s ear, might have been responsible for the reversal
in the cuing effect (in the eye closed condition) observed in Experiment 1. We
predicted that if the presence of the ear was responsible for the faster responses
to auditory targets appearing at the ear side, by taking the ear away from the
agent’s head we should expect such ‘ear-effect’ to cease.
3.3.1. Methods
Participants
Fourteen participants (2 males; mean age 23 years), all students from the Uni-
versity of Nijmegen, received either course credits or five Euro for their partic-
ipation at the experiment. All had normal (or corrected-to normal) vision and
normal hearing, and were all right handed. Participants were naive as to the
purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli and procedure
Except for the missing ear the procedure and the material used in this experi-
ment were identical to Experiment 1 (see Figure 3.3).
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Experiment 2 
Figure 3.3.: Similarly to Ex-
periment 1, each trial began
with a fixation cross (2000-
msec.) followed by the head
cue (150-msec) and the audi-
tory target randomly presented
(110-msec) from either the left
of the right speaker. In contrast
to Experiment 1 the agent’s ear
was not visible.
3.3.2. Results
In total, 4.2 % of all trials, considered as erroneous (e.g., omissions, anticipations,
false alarms, as well as early and late responses), were removed from the analysis.
A repeated measures ANOVA with Head Orientation and Gaze Type as within-
subjects factors, showed a significant effect for Head Orientation F (1, 13) = 12.5,
p < .05, but no main effect for Gaze Type (F < 1, p > .05). Moreover,
Head Orientation and Gaze Type did not interact (F < 1) indicating that the
response pattern in the eyes open condition [i.e., responses to head congruent
trials (272 msec) being faster than responses to head incongruent trials (281
msec), t(13) = 3.20, p <.05] was similar to the response pattern in the eyes closed
condition [i.e., responses to head congruent trials (270 msec) were also faster
than responses to head incongruent trials (280 msec), t(13) = 2.75, p < .05] (see
Figure 3.4).
3.3.3. Discussion
This experiment confirmed the earlier visuo-auditory cueing effect by showing
that observing another’s head oriented toward an auditory target location does
facilitate the detection of a (gazed upon) auditory target. In addition, it showed
that if no ears were depicted facilitation occurred irrespectively of whether the
agent’s eyes were open or closed.
3.4. Experiment 3
From the second experiment one might conclude that the presence of the ear
might have been responsible for the cueing pattern found in the first experiment
(the eyes closed condition). More specifically, one might argue that the difference
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Figure 3.4.: The upper part of the figure
illustrates the crucial experimental com-
bination where the head direction (with
closed and opens eyes) was either congru-
ent or incongruent with the target loca-
tion. The lower part of the figure illus-
trates the mean reaction times is Exper-
iment 2, showing that that, regardless of
whether the eyes were open or closed, the
auditory targets appearing at the eye side
were detected faster than the targets ap-
pearing at the ear side. This cueing effect
was different form the one seen in Exper-
iment 1.
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between Experiment 1 (targets propagating from the ear side, when the eyes
were closed, being facilitated) and Experiment 2 (targets propagating form the
missing ear side, with the eyes being closed, not being facilitated) relies on the
spatial compatibility between the ear and the sound location. This ‘perceptual
processing’ interpretation suggests that when the agent’s eyes were open the eyes
would be the main feature to trigger the observer’s attention, whereas when they
were closed the most prominent head feature would have to be the ear. However,
considering the human ability to synthesise, infer and simulate other’s action
intention, one might also argue that the lack of a cueing benefit in Experiment
2 could have derived from participants inferring that an agent without the ear
cannot auditory attend while the cueing benefit for targets appearing at the ear
side in the eyes close condition in Experiment 1 might also have been consequent
to inferential processes on the agent’s auditory behaviour.
Thus, in order to disentangle between the perceptual and the inferential ac-
count, we ran a third experiment where the ear would be (perceptually) absent,
but one could still infer the agent as able to auditorily attend. More specifically,
in one condition we concealed the agent’s ear with a hat, through which the
agent would still be able to attend to external sounds, and in the other condi-
tion we concealed the agent’s head with a “tight” helmet, through which the
agent “would not be able to attend to low volumole sounds”.Thus, if directly
seeing the agent’s ear is crucial for shifting the observer’s attention, neither the
hat nor the helmet should affect the observer’s alignment of attention. Confirm-
ing this prediction would support the perceptual account already evidenced in
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Figure 3.5.: Observers were randomly presented with two agents: one wearing a hat and the
other wearing a helmet. As in the earlier two experiments each trial began with a fixation
cross (2000-msec.) followed by the head cue (150-msec). After one of the three possible delay
intervals (SOA) of 50-, 150-, or 500-msec, the auditory target was randomly presented from
either the left of right speaker. Participants were required to reports it by means of a button
press.
Experiment 2. If, however anticipating the agent’s ability to auditory attend is
what observers pay attention at, only the agent with the hat would facilitate
the observers’ attention. Confirming this latter prediction would support the
findings of Experiment 1 in favour of the inferential account.
3.4.1. Methods
Participants
Sixteen participants (4 males; mean age 24 years), all students from the Univer-
sity of Nijmegen, received either course credits or five Euro for their participation
at the experiment. All had normal (or corrected-to-normal) vision and hearing,
were right handed, and naive as to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli, design and procedure
The apparatus, stimuli and design were identical to the previous experiments
with exception to two changes. The visual primes were modified and depicted
in half of the trials the agent’s ear occluded by a hat and in the other half the
agent’s ear occluded by a helmet (see Figure 3.5). This change is also reflected in
the experimental design were Head Cover (hat, helmet) factor was added to the
existing Gaze Type (eyes open, eyes closed), Head Orientation (head oriented
toward the speaker, head oriented away from the speaker). Given the extra
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(Head Cover) factor, the experiment was longer than the earlier two, consisting
in 300 trials and 45 control (or catch) trials, presented in a random order.
Everything else, including the instruction to ignore the agent’s head features
and/or orientation and report the sound independently from its propagating
location, remained the same as before.
3.4.2. Results
After excluding the erroneous responses (i.e., omissions, false alarms, late and
early responses), which accounted for less than the 2.0% of all trials, the re-
maining data points were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA, with Gaze
Type (eyes open, eyes closed), Head Orientation (head oriented 45◦ toward the
speaker, head oriented 45◦ away from the speaker), and Head Cover (hat, hel-
met) as within subjects factors (see Panel 3 of Figure 2). The analysis revealed
a trend for Gaze Type and Head Direction (both Fs > 3.5, both ps < .10)
but no Head Cover effect F (1, 15) = 1.3, p >.05. Importantly, however, Head
Direction and Head Cover interacted with each other, F (1, 15) = 7.3, p <.05,
showing that responses to head congruent targets were faster when the agent
was wearing a hat (424 msec) than when wearing a helmet (430 msec).
For a deeper insight on the data we divided the three-way (Head Orientation,
Gaze Type and Head Cover) interaction F (1, 15) = 6.7, p <.05 into Hat and
Helmet data points. In the Hat condition, the ANOVA with Gaze Type and
Head Orientation as within subjects factors showed neither a Gaze Type nor
a Head Orientation main effect (both F s< 1). Importantly, however, the two
factors interacted with each other F (1, 15) = 14.2, p < .05, indicating that when
the agent’s eyes were open, responses (420 msec) to head congruent targets were
faster than the responses (426 msec) to head incongruent targets t(15) = 2.8,
p <.05, whereas when the agent’s eyes were closed, responses (432 msec) to head
congruent trials were slower than responses (422 msec) to incongruent targets
t(15) = 2.8, p <.05 (see Figure 3.6).
In the Helmet condition, the anaysis on Gaze Type and Head Orientation
showed a significant main effect for Head Orientation F (1, 15) = 6.7, p <.05,
indicating that responses to head congruent targets, for eyes open (424 msec)
and eyes closed (423 msec), were faster than responses to head incongruent
targets, for both eyes open (428 msec) and eyes closed (436 msec) respectively.
The lack of a main effect for Gaze Type [F (1, 15) = 3.1, p > .05] suggested that
the difference between the eyes open and eyes closed was overruled by the head
direction. No other factor, or combination of factors, reached the significance
level (α = .05).
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Figure 3.6.: The upper part of the figure illustrates the two types of Head Cover obstructing
the agent’s ear: the hat and the helmet. The lower part of the figure illustrates the findings
of Experiment 3. In the hat condition, when the agent’s eyes were open, the auditory targets
appearing at the eye side were detected faster than the targets appearing at the ear side.
When the agent’s eyes were closed targets appearing at the eye side were detected slower than
the targets appearing at the ear side. In contrast, in the helmet condition (right side) the
targets were detected faster in the head congruent trials than in the incongruent ones.
3.4.3. Discussion
In line with the two previous findings, our third experiment confirmed the exis-
tence of cross-modal orienting with a visual prime affecting the detection of an
auditory target. Furthermore, it showed that when the agent wore a hat and the
eyes were closed, the alignment of the observer’s attention to sounds appearing
at the agent’s ear side were faster than the alignment to sounds appearing at
the (closed) eyes side, whereas when the agent wore a helmet, the alignment
of the observer’s attention to sounds appearing at the eyes side—independently
from whether the eyes were open or closed—was faster than the alignment to
the sounds appearing at the ear side. Since the agent’s ear was occluded in both
conditions, we exclude the possibility that this (latter) cross-modal orienting is
due to a perceptual or spatial (i.e., ear-sound vicinity) processes. Rather, we
argue that inferring the other as being able to auditorily attend does facilitate
the observer’s visuospatial attention.
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3.5. General Discussions
In this study, we found evidence that supports visuo-auditory cross-modal pro-
cessing in socially relevant or triadic situation. Experiment 1 showed that when
the agent’s eyes were open, the sounds propagating from the eyes side were de-
tected faster than the sounds propagating from the ear side. In contrast, when
the agent’s eyes were closed, the sounds propagating from the ear side were
detected faster than sounds propagating from the eyes. In Experiment 2, with
the ear removed from the agent’s head, the ‘ear effect’ disappeared. Finally,
Experiment 3 showed that the ‘ear effect’ was not likely to be due to a spatial
(ear-sound) processing, since it persisted in the ‘hat’ condition but disappeared
in the ‘helmet’ condition. Rather, it indicated that participants did selectively
align their attention with the sound location they though was being visually or
auditory attended by the agent.
On one hand, our findings are in line with the cross-modal orienting litera-
ture showing that cues in one modality do enhance the processing of the stimuli
in another modality, for healthy (Driver & Spence 1998; Bolognini, Frassinetti,
Serino, & La`davas, 2005; Mazza, Turatto, Rossi, Umilta`, 2006), as well as neu-
ropsychological impaired (Lovelace, Stein, & Wallace, 2003; Pavani, Ladavas,
& Driver, 2005) subjects. On the other hand, they are novel in that they
evidenced a cross-modal orienting in a socially relevant context, where the ob-
server’s attention is not triggered by an arbitrary visual cue (i.e., abrupt change
in luminance/colour) but by another agent’s attentive act. Such a finding was
acquired in compliance with the two rules typically associated with cross-modal
orienting: the spatial and temporal rule (see Stein & Meredith 1993). According
to the spatial rule, only spatially coincident stimuli produce neuronal response
enhancement in the neuron’s excitatory area. That is, when auditory and visual
receptive fields of such (bimodal) neurons overlap (Jay & Sparks 1987; King
& Hutchings 1987), spatially coincident audio and visual stimuli will also en-
hance one another’s effects. If, however, they do not overlap (or fall within the
inhibitory fields), the visual and the auditory information won’t be integrated,
and visual stimuli won’t enhance the auditory ones (see Stein & Meredith 1993).
According to the temporal rule, maximal levels of cross-modal enhancement are
achieved when two inputs are presented simultaneously or at short intervals (up
to approximately 300 msec) from each other (Stein & Meredith, 1993; see also
McDonald et. al., 2000; Mazza et. al., 2006). Several studies have shown the
results of long prime-target intervals in unimodal orienting (Frassinetti et al.,
2002, Bolognini et al., 2005), and although our study did not aim at evaluat-
ing the temporal (i.e., the time-course) properties of the cross-modal orienting,
we complied with the temporal rule by presenting the auditory targets in short
intervals not exceeding the 300 msec.
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Regarding this latter rule and considering that reflexive responses must be
resistant (i.e., insensitive) to one’s expectancy (Jonides, 1981), we believe that
further investigation is needed to clarify whether simultaneous, rather than se-
quential, prime-target presentation of two stimuli in two different modalities
would also facilitate the participants responses. Furthermore, considering the
studies on unimodal orienting showing a cueing effect for targets presented at
long (prime-target) intervals (Frassinetti et al., 2002; Bolognini et al., 2005), it
seems interesting to investigate whether this effect would also be reached with
complex (i.e., socially relevant) stimuli like the ones used in our study.
Another novelty of this study is that is that it suggests that observers do not
strictly align their attention with another’s face features (eyes or ears), but that
rather the observer infer whether the agent is visually (i.e., looking) or audito-
rily (i.e., listening) attending. This human ability of inferring and anticipating
another’s action (intentions), ascribed to a neural circuit that is active both
when one performs an intentional action as well as when one observes another
agent performing the same intentional action (see mirror neurons: Rizzolatti,
Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004), seems
to serve the action observation-execution matching system through which hu-
mans understand other’s behaviour. The system holds that, thanks to neural
circuit that are activated both when planning/executing an act as well as when
observing another agent performing the same act there is a functional equiv-
alence between observing, inferring, and simulating other’s action (Decety &
Grezes, 1999). Such functional equivalence is best described by the simulation
theory2 (for more on the role of the mirror neurons in simulation see Goldman,
1989) according to which, in order to understand another’s action intention one
does internally mimic the other’s behaviour without performing it (Wilson &
Knoblich, 2005). In our study this assumption indicates that the observer’s at-
tention was (selectively) triggered when observing the attending agent (with the
eyes open, or the unobstructed ear) but not when observing the non-attending
agent (with closed eyes of the obstructed ear), because the observer might au-
tomatically simulates the agent’s intentions: attending the target onset. Our
findings show that already at an early attentional level, simulations are goal-
directed rather than spatial directed (see for more on this topic: Umilta`, Kohler,
Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2001; Kohler, Keysers, Umilta`,
Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2002). In addition, considering the triadic setting
of this simulative process, the findings of our study complies also with the joint
attention processing suggesting that, in socially relevant situations, one does not
merely observe, but rather infer the consequences of another’s behaviour (see
2Although other theories like ‘Theory theory’ (see Carruthers & Smith 1996), the ‘Interaction
theory’ (see Gallagher, 2001), the ‘Associative learning theory’ (see Schultz & Dickinson,
2000) do all regard the process of action-understanding, the Simulation Theory makes a
clear prediction based on the neural bases and functioning of the mirror neuron system.
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Tomasello, Carptenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Thus, inferring the agent
as attending, rather than merely fixating the sound location, does affect the
observer’s responsiveness.
Taken together, our study showed that visuo-auditory crossmodal cueing does
occur in joint attention situations, where two agents try to understand and/or
anticipate the other’s next move. Importantly, we showed that cross-modal
orienting is not a consequence of low-level (i.e., spatial) processing, but that
it rather relies on high-level (i.e., cognitive) processes, such as anticipatory or
inferential mechanisms. Humans seem to intrinsically infer and simulate what
others are attending, and these processes seem to be critical to a world in which
we cooperate with each other.
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Part II.
Grasping other’s attention

Chapter 4
Joint attention in action
observation
Inferring another’s action intentions modulates visual
attention
4 Joint attention in action observation
Abstract. Research has shown that the observation of another’s
actions modulates the observer’s visual sensitivity. The present
study investigates the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms be-
hind this joint attention effect in more detail. By presenting
participants with two hand postures (pointing and grasping) di-
rected toward a lateral object (cup), we measured the partici-
pant’s speed of detecting a target near the object. Experiments
1a and 1b supported the perceptual account, showing inhibition
of return of joint attention for both postures. Experiment 2,
however, confirmed the cognitive account, showing that joint at-
tention benefits from cognitive processes that interpret the (ac-
tion) relation between the hand and the cup. Taken together,
these findings suggest that action simulation is crucial in infer-
ring other’s action intentions, and that such inferences modulate
the observer’s visual attention.
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4.1. Introduction
Recent studies have proposed the existence of coupling mechanisms between
another person’s and one’s own action potentials, suggesting that another’s
motor acts do change our own motor readiness. Specifically, initiating a fin-
ger movement in response to seeing another’s finger moving facilitates the ob-
server’s responses more than seeing an arbitrary cue prompting the same move-
ment (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000; Stu¨rmer, Aschersleben,
& Prinz, 2000). Similarly, observers are facilitated in performing a grasping
action after having observed similar actions taking place (Brass, Bekkering, &
Prinz, 2001; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Blakemore & Frith
2005). Furthermore, it has been shown that observing another’s hand postures
leads to the activation of the same brain areas that are active when the ob-
server performs those same hand actions (see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004 for
a review), suggesting that humans have the ability to infer the intentions of an-
other person through observing their actions (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The
aim of the present study is to investigate whether another’s motor acts change
the observer’s attentional readiness, and whether these attentional changes are
derived from low-level perceptual or higher-level cognitive processing.
A study by Fischer and Szymkowiak (2004) showed for the first time that an-
other’s action facilitates also the observer’s perceptual readiness. In their study,
the observers were shown pictures of a static hands (pointing and grasping) ap-
proaching and priming one of three horizontally arranged tangerines. After the
hand returned to a neutral resting position, and following a random delay out
of three possible intervals, a visual probe appeared unpredictably over the left
or right tangerine, creating three trial categories: valid trials, with the probe
appearing over the primed (pointed or grasped at) tangerine, neutral trials, with
the hand priming the central tangerine and the probe appearing on one of the
non-primed tangerines, and invalid trials, with the probe appearing on the tan-
gerine opposite to the primed tangerine. The observers were required to detect
the probes, and in the pointing condition they were faster in so doing when the
probe appeared in the valid than in the neutral and invalid trials, whereas in
the grasping condition, they detected the probes faster in the invalid than in
neutral and valid trials. The authors interpreted these findings within the joint
attention framework, suggesting that the encoding of spatially directed, non-
predictive, intentional postures has attentional consequences for the observer.
They suggested that the difference between pointing and grasping could be due
to some sort of action simulation a process responsible for generating predictions
on another person’s actions, anticipating the occurrence of critical events, and
coordinating one’s own actions with somebody else’s actions (Gallese & Gold-
man, 1998; see also Knoblich & Jordan, 2003). Additionally, they suggested that
pointing hands prompt the observer’s attention because they represent an ongo-
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ing action, whereas grasping hands cannot prompt observer’s attention because
they depict an already completed action.
In spite of the fact that the simulation account provides a unified account for
both perceptual and motor coupling, before accepting it as the process respon-
sible for the above attentional modulation, we must first exclude the possibility
that perceptual mechanisms might explain this modulation. We noted that, in
Fischer and Szymkowiak’s study, grasping hands were shown near the tanger-
ines while pointing hands were shown far from the tangerines. It is well known
that visual manipulations near the probe locations lead to a biphasic attention
pattern, with an initial attentional facilitation and a subsequent attentional in-
hibition1, whereas visual manipulations far from the probe location do not. We
hypothesized that the distal-proximal pointing-grasping confound might have
partially accounted for their findings. But in order to test for it, we firstly
replicated Fischer and Szymkowiak’s 2004 study.
4.2. Experiment 1a
This experiment is a replication of the Fischer and Szymkowiak (2004) study,
with the slight difference that here the target object, i.e., the tangerines were
substituted by coffee cups. The design and responses were identical to the
original study.
4.2.1. Methods
Participants
Twenty students (17 female; mean age 21.2 years) from the university of Ni-
jmegen took part in the experiment. All participants were right-handed, with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and received 4.50 Euro for their partici-
pation.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli, measuring 200 x 120 mm, consisted of color photographs of three
identical inverted cups (photographed from above) with a resting right hand (40
mm) presented above the center cup (see Figure 4.1).
The hand adopted either a pointing posture with the index finger directed
to the center of one of the cups, or a grasping posture with the index finger
and thumb contacting one of the cups. The target, a 10 mm black circle, was
1Inhibition of return (also known as IOR) occurs when the delay between the manipulation
and the probe exceeds the 300 msec (see for a review Klein, 2000). Furthermore this time
interval was used in Fischer and Szymkowiak’s study.
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4.2. Experiment 1a
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Figure 4.1.: Each trial began with a hand resting for 2000-msec, with either pointing or
grasping postures appearing for 100-msec. After returning back to the resting position and
following one of the three random intervals of 200-, 400-, or 600-msec, the target (black circle)
appeared either at the left or the right of the cup. Subjects were required to respond to its
appearance by pressing a button.
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Figure 4.2.: The experimental design was identical to Experiment 1 except for that here
pointing was presented near the cup. This way pointing and grasping cued the cup from a
near distance.
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superimposed over the center of the left or right coffee cup.Each trial began
with the hand resting for 2000 msec, subsequentially pointing or grasping one of
the three cups for 100 msec, and immediately returning to the resting position.
Following one of three (randomly) time intervals of 200 msec, 400 msec, or 600
msec, the target appeared (randomly) on either the left or right cup, creating
thus three stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) intervals of 300 msec, 500 msec,
and 700 msec. Participants were instructed to lift their right index finger as
quickly as possible when they detected a target, and to withhold responses to
the catch trials since in these trials there was no target. There were 30 valid
trials (either hand posture directed toward the cup showing latter the target), 30
invalid trials (either hand posture directed toward the cup opposite to the one
showing the target), 30 neutral trials (either hand posture directed to the central
cup), and 30 catch trials (where neither hand posture was followed by a target).
Participants were explicitly informed to be as accurate and as fast as possible
with their responses, and also that the factors Posture Type (pointing hand,
grasping hand), Validity (valid, invalid, and neutral trial), and Stimulus Onset
Asynchrony (SOA: 300 msec, 500 msec, 700 msec) were randomized, and that
the primes were not predictive with respect to target location. The experiment
took approximately 35 minutes to complete.
Data acquisition and analysis
In order to measure the detection time we used an electromagnetic position
tracking system (miniBIRD 800TM , Ascension Technology Corporation). A
sensor was attached to the participants’ right hand index finger and measured
their finger lifting movements with a sampling rate of 100 Hz. The movement
kinematics was analyzed off-line. We applied a fourth-order Butterworth low
pass filter with a cut-off frequency of 10 Hz on the raw data. Reaction times
(RTs) were determined by the time between the target onset and finger move-
ment onset, defined as the first moment in time when the tangential velocity
exceeded the threshold of 10 cm/s and remained above this level for the min-
imum duration of 50 msec. All trials with RTs more than 1.5 standard devia-
tions from each participant’s mean were excluded from the statistical analysis
(cf. Ratcliff, 1993). Responses to catch trials were minimal (less than 3.8%)
and were removed from the analysis, leaving approximately 96% of the data for
this purpose.
4.2.2. Results
The mean detection times (see left panel in Figure 4.3) are derived from the mul-
tivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)2 with Posture Type (pointing hand,
2A multivariate F-test based on the Pillai-Bartlett V criterion was used here (cf. O’Brien &
Kaiser, 1985).
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Figure 4.3.: Panel 1 illustrates the mean response times for pointing and grasping condition
as a function of Validity. Panel 2 illustrates the net cueing effect for pointing and grasping,
with positive values reflecting cueing benefits and negative ones reflecting cueing costs.
grasping hand), Validity (valid, invalid, and neutral trials), and Stimulus On-
set Asynchrony (SOA: 300 msec, 500 msec, 700 msec) as within-subject fac-
tors. To start with, the analysis showed a SOA main effect, F (2, 18) = 2.36,
p < .05, deriving from the fact that at the longer 700 msec SOA reaction times
(RTs) were reliably slower (358 msec) than at the 500 msec SOA (342 msec),
t(19) = 2.98, p < .01, and the 300 msec SOA (340 msec), t(19) = 0.9, p > .05.
Secondly, the interaction between Validity and Posture Type was highly sig-
nificant, F (2, 19) = 11.20, p < .05, indicating that, in the pointing condition,
validly cued targets were detected significantly faster (343 msec) than invalid
(352 msec) t(19) = −2.4, p < .05, or neutral (355 msec) t(19) = −3.1, p < .05,
ones while, in the grasping conditions, validly cued targets tended to be detected
slower (355 msec) than invalid (346 msec) t(19)=-2.1, p < .05, and neutral tar-
gets (345 msec) t(19) = 2.0, p < .058.
This cueing pattern was confirmed by an additional MANOVA with Posture
Type (pointing hands, grasping hands) and SOA (300 msec, 500 msec, 700 msec)
as within subject factors, on data points derived from subtracting the valid RTs
from the invalid RTs, and constituting the net cueing effect of each posture type
(see right panel in Figure 4.3). The analysis, showed a main effect for Posture
Type F (1, 19) = 11.2, p < .05, indicating that the overall cueing benefit (i.e.,
attentional facilitation) derived from observing the finger pointing at the cup was
significantly different from the cueing cost (i.e., attentional inhibition) derived
from observing the grasping posture t(19) = 3.4, p <.05. Additionally, this
analysis showed a trendt effect for SOA F (1, 19) = 3.2, p >.06, indicating that
the above interaction might be mainly explained by the early and pronounced
inhibitory pattern in the grasping condition. Paired samples t-tests between
valid and invalid trials on either Posture Type confirmed this by showing that:
in the pointing condition, even in the slowest (700 msec) SOA, cueing costs did
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not reach the significance level t(19) = 1.2, p >.05, whereas, in the grasping
condition, they approached the significant level already at the 500 msec SOA
t(19) = 2.0, p > .05, becoming fully significant at the slowest (700 msec) SOA
t(19) = 2.9, p <.05.
4.2.3. Discussion
This experiment successfully replicated Fischer and Szymkowiak’s (2004) find-
ings showing that pointing hands facilitate while grasping hands inhibit the ob-
server’s attention. In other words, simulating to-be-performed (pointing) acts
attracts attention while the simulation of already-performed (grasping) actions
does not.
4.3. Experiment 1b
This experiment controlled the distal-proximal and pointing-grasping confound.
Because visual manipulations near the probe location leads to IOR (with the
inhibition occurring when the delay between the manipulation and the probe
exceeds the 300 msec) while it is absent for manipulations occurring far from the
probe location, we modified the original design by bringing the pointing hand
closer to the cup. Since here both postures would be proximal to the probe
location, we predicted that both postures would yield in inhibitory effects that
would indicate a low-level perceptual processing of the scene in the previous
experiment.
4.3.1. Methods
Participants
Fourteen new students (10 female; mean age 21 years old) from the University
of Nijmegen took part in this experiment. All participants were right-handed
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and received 4.50 Euro for their par-
ticipation.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli were similar to that of Experiment 1a with the only difference that
the pointing pictures were replaced so that now both pointing and grasping
seemed to approach one of the two laterally positioned cups (see Figure 4.2 on
page 53).
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Figure 4.4.: Panel 1 illustrates the mean detection for both postures in valid, neutral and
invalid trials. Panel 2 illustrated the net cueing effect for pointing and grasping, with the
positive values reflecting cueing benefits while negative values reflecting cueing costs.
4.3.2. Results
Data acquisition was identical to that of Experiment 1a. Errors were infrequent
(less than 3 %) and roughly, 97% of the trials were included in the following
statistical analysis.
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with Posture Type (pointing
hand, grasping hand), Validity (valid, invalid, and neutral trials), and Stimulus
Onset Asynchrony (SOA: 300 msec, 500 msec, 700 msec) as within-subjects
factors (see Figure 2a for means) showed a significant main effect for SOA
F (2, 12) = 10.8, p < .05, but neither a main effect nor an interaction involving
Posture Type all F (1, 13) < 1, p > .05. Additionally it showed an interaction
between SOA and Validity, F (4, 10) = 4.8, p < .05.
The net cueing effect MANOVA analysis with Posture Type (pointing hand,
grasping hand) and SOA (300ms, 500ms, 700ms) as within subject factors
showed a main effect for SOA F (2, 12) = 10.8, p < .05, indicating that overall,
the cueing effect changed across the different SOA conditions, going from an
initial benefit (+35 msec) at the shortest SOA to a significant inhibition (-33
msec) at the longest SOA (see left panel in Figure 4.4). Paired samples t-tests
between valid and invalid trials on either Posture Type showed that: in the
pointing condition in the fastest (300 msec) SOA the cueing benefit was signif-
icant t(13) = 3.36, p < .05, as was the cueing costs in the slowest (700 msec)
SOA t(13) = −3.45, p < .05. Similarly, in the grasping condition in the fastest
(300 msec) SOA the cueing benefit was significant t(13) = 3.10, p < .05, as was
the cueing costs in the slowest (700 msec) SOA, t(13) = −2.40, p < .05 (see left
panel in Figure 4.4).
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4.3.3. Discussion
When pointing postures were presented near the cup, they yielded the same
cueing pattern as the grasping postures. This finding indicates that the spatial
confound did contribute to the pointing and grasping cueing dissociation seen in
Fischer and Szymkowiak’s (2004), as well as in our replication (Experiment 1a)
study. Additionally, it indicates that the joint attention process in the task relied
on low-level perceptual processing, such as inhibition of return (see Footnote 1).
4.4. Experiment 2
The previous experiment suggests that the cueing effect was due to low-level
perceptual (i.e., spatial contiguity) processing, but this does not suffice to rule
out the involvement of high-level cognitive processing. Spatial contiguity might
have covered up the involvement of high-level inference and simulation processes.
One way to proceed in testing this argumentation is by spatially separating
the grasping postures from the potential target location. Fischer and colleagues
(Fischer, Prinz, & Lotz, 2006) recently adopted this approach. They presented
observers with two objects of different diameter (one small, one large) at the
bottom of an array, and a static hand with either a power or precision grip.
When the target was randomly shown over one of the two objects, the observers
were faster in detecting the target appearing over the grasp-congruent object
than grasp-incongruent object. Moreover, they found the same effects when the
grasp aperture predicted the target on the grasp-incongruent object. These find-
ings seem to support the idea of an obligatory action simulation from observing
other’s grasping postures.
A second way to proceed in supporting the involvement of high-level cognitive
processing in the task consists in introducing a functional or causal relationship
between the hand and the cup. This approach was adopted in the present ex-
periment. Here we presented subjects with a hand that seemingly displaced,
not only approached, the cup. Consistent with the proposal of Fischer and
Szymkowiak (2004), we hypothesized that inferring the causal relationship be-
tween the hand and the cup (i.e., the hand ‘pushing’ the cup) would modulate
the observer’s attention. Furthermore, we hypothesized that this processing
would abolish the inhibitory effects seen in the two previous experiments. By
confirming these two predictions, we would confirm the proposal the attentional
allocation in response to another’s observed action postures benefits from in-
ferential processes that interpret the manipulator (hand) and the manipulated
object (cup) as interacting with and functional to each other.
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4.4. Experiment 2
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Figure 4.5.: In this experiment the to-be-detected target was the cup itself. After the hand
returned to its resting position, the cup moved upwards, seemingly creating a causal relation
between the grasping postures and the moving target.
4.4.1. Methods
Participants
Seventeen new students from the University of Nijmegen took part in the exper-
iment. All participants were right-handed with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and received 4.50 Euro for their participation.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli were similar to the previous experiments with the exception that
after pointing and grasping postures retracted to the starting position one of
the cups moved approximately 50 mm upwards (see Figure 4.5). This caused an
apparent motion seemingly caused by the hand-object interaction in the valid
trials only. Observers had to respond to the cup displacement. The rest of the
procedure, data acquisition and the analysis were identical to the ones of the
previous two experiments. There were only 4% errors on catch trial, and after
trimming 96% of the data entered the statistical analyses.
4.4.2. Results
A MANOVA with Posture Type (pointing hand, grasping hand), Validity (valid,
invalid, and neutral cue), and Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA: 300ms, 500ms,
700ms) as within-subjects factors showed no main effect for Posture Type, F <
1, p > .05. I did however show a main effect for Validity F (2, 15) = 9.4, p < .05,
suggesting that responses to valid trials (330 msec) were faster than responses
to invalid (341 msec) [t(16) = −2.2, p < .05] and neutral (347 msec) [t(16) =
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Figure 4.6.: Panel 1 illustrates the response time for both postures as a function of Validity.
Panel 2 illustrates the net cueing effect for pointing and grasping, with positive values reflecting
the cueing benefits and negative values reflecting the cueing costs.
−3.3, p < .05] trials. It also showed a significant SOA and Validity interaction,
F (4, 10) = 4.8, p < .05, suggesting a change in the cueing benefit pattern
over time (see left panel in Figure 4.6). The net cueing effect MANOVA, with
Posture Type (pointing hand, grasping hand), and SOA (300ms, 500ms, 700ms)
as within subject factors, did not show any significant difference (all Fs < 1, all
ps> .05), confirming the cancellation of IOR (see right panel in Figure 4.6) and
suggesting that the net cueing effect was similar for both posture types. This
suggestion was indirectly confirmed by a paired sample t-tests showing that the
cueing benefit for pointing (13 msec) was not different from that of grasping (12
msec) [t(16) = 0.2, p > .05].
4.4.3. Discussion
This experiment provided two novel findings. First, the perceived causal rela-
tionship between the manipulating hands and the subsequent displacement of
the cups, in valid trials only, did capture the observer’s attention. This find-
ing confirms similar attentional effects derived by causal interaction of objects
(e.g., bottle–cork screw), recently documented in other studies (see Riddoch,
Humphreys, Edwards, Baker, & Wilson, 2003). Second, the causal hand-cup re-
lationship cancelled the inhibitory effects seen in the two previous experiments.
This finding provides important new evidence on how inferring and simulating
other’s actions contribute to the observer’s attention modulation.
4.5. General discussion
This study investigated the role of hand postures in modulating the observer’s
visual attention, and showed that high-level cognitive processes, such as inferring
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and simulating the sensory consequence of another’ s hand action, affect the
observer’s attention. In the following paragraphs we will briefly summarize our
findings, and explain their contribution to the action-understanding literature.
The first experiment replicated the findings of Fischer and Szymkowiak (2004),
and showed that pointing actions facilitated the observer’s attention, whereas
grasping actions did not. We argued that this pointing-grasping difference re-
lied equally on perceptual (the spatial hand-cup relation) and cognitive (the
functional hand-cup relation) processes. The first, perceptual, hypothesis was
tested by presenting both pointing and grasping in spatial proximity to the
target location in the second experiment. In support of the perceptual hypothe-
sis the pointing-grasping difference disappeared. Perceptual processing (spatial
contiguity) had affected the observer’s attention. However, this finding could
not dismiss that actions are also processed in terms of their anticipated sen-
sory consequences (Greenwald, 1970), and that action understanding relies on
inferring other’s action intentions (Stock & Stock, 2004). We tested this sec-
ond, cognitive, hypothesis, by creating a situation where inferential processes
would be needed in order to comply with the task. In the third experiment we
found that inferring the hand as the cause of the cup displacement not only
facilitated the observer’s attention, but also canceled the previously observed
inhibition, thus confirming that the overall facilitation was due to higher-level
cognitive processes rather than exclusively perceptual ones (i.e., cup motion 3).
Taken together, the results of this study do not merely show that observing
another person’s postures attracts our own attention, but also that anticipat-
ing or inferring the functional relationship between a manipulator (hand) and a
manipulated object (cup) can similarly affect our attention.
With regard to the functional processing of a scene, it has been proposed that
action postures are integrated into one’s long-term memory in terms of what
they represent (Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey, & Lederman, 1993). The sight
of another’s action prompts the sensory-motor representations underlying the
visual information and this facilitates the understanding of the other’s action
intentions. Action-understanding is a process shaped very early in age, with
18-months-old infants already able to infer the ‘failed’ attempt of another’s in-
tentional act by merely focusing on the physics of the observed act (Meltzoff,
1995). It affects the observer’s motor readiness in imitative responses to ac-
tions performed only by humans, and not by mechanical devices, such as robot
arms (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Blakemore & Frith, 2005; for an
alternative view see Castiello, 2003; Oztop, Franklin, Chaminade, & Cheng,
2005; Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005). Additionally, it affects their atten-
3In spite of its saliency, motion alone is not sufficient in affecting the observer’s attention if
it doesn’t serve a purpose (Yantis & Egeth, 1999; Abrams & Christ, 2003) or if it does
not cause the reinterpretation of the scene (Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994). If however it does
affect the observer’s attention, then IOR is also present (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).
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tional readiness. In an earlier non-imitative study, we showed that observer’s
attention was selectively modulated by observing simulable action postures (i.e.,
human hands) and non-simulable postures (prehensile u-shapes), with only the
simulable postures affecting the observer’s attentional readiness.
All these studies confirm the proposal that humans’ action-understanding
abilities evolve from an action execution/observation matching system. This
system enables humans to detect their conspecific’s mental states, a process
that subsequently paves the way to mind-reading mechanisms (Gallese & Gold-
man, 1998). Since this systems assumes that there is a functional equivalence
between observing, intending, simulating, and performing an action (for a criti-
cal review, see Decety & Grezes, 1999), a way to detect the other’s mental state
is by means of simulation: by matching the other’s mental states with resonant
states of their own (Gordon, 1986, 1995) or by generating, but not perform-
ing, similar actions in ourselves (Wilson, & Knoblich, 2005; Jeannerod, 2001;
Prinz, 1997). This way, by simulating, subjects imagine themselves as perform-
ing the given action rather than matching the other’s postures only (Wilson &
Knoblich, 2005). And this view is supported by our study showing that sub-
jects do not only simulate the other’s action postures, but also the manipulation
taking place between the other’s hand posture and the object of interest. In ad-
dition, this finding is also relevant for the joint attention hypothesis (Tomasello,
1995; Tomasello, Carptenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), since it suggests that
when interacting, one not only attends to the other’s next move, but also to the
sensory consequences of the other’s action is attended.
In conclusion, this study showed that low-level perceptual processing of an
action scene plays an important role in visual attention. More importantly, it
showed that high-level cognitive processes, like inferring and simulating other’s
action goals, do modulate the observer’s visual attention.
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Grasping another’s
intention
Purposeful actions attract attention
5 Grasping another’s intention
Abstract. While it is known that the observing of others’ ac-
tions facilitates the transformation of the (observed) visual in-
puts into motor predictions, the present study investigates how
the attribution of goal-directedness to other’s actions affects the
observer’s attention.In a simple detection task, participants re-
sponded to a visual target appearing on one of two balls pre-
sented adjacent to either two different hand postures (full and
precision aperture) or two different u-shapes (small and large
spreading) matching the two hand apertures. Their responses
indicated that, in comparison to the non-goal-directed configu-
ration (i.e., targets appearing on the ball not fitting the hand
aperture), the goal-directed configuration (i.e., targets appearing
on the ball fitting the hand aperture) facilitated the observer’s
alignment of attention. Furthermore, they showed that the prim-
ing effect was absent in the inanimate (U-shape) condition, oc-
curring only in the animate (hand) condition. In line with the
visuo-motor literature, and in addition to it, our findings indicate
that attributing goal-directedness to animate postures modulate
the observer’s attention.
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5.1. Introduction
The way we understand others’ actions, and the way this understanding affects
our own behaviour, is crucial for interacting with other conspecifics. That is why
humans pay attention to other’s social signals that disclose other’s intentions
by indicating their region of interest (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). Typ-
ically, literature has focused and shown that observing other’s social signals,
such as a hand posture, facilitates the observer’s motor behavior (Bekkering,
Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000; Fischer & Szymkowiak, 2005). Brass and col-
leagues (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, Prinz, 2000) have shown that observers
are faster at initiating a finger movement in response to observing another per-
son moving that same finger than in response to observing an arbitrary cue
prompting them in doing so (for similar results see also Stu¨rmer, Aschersleben,
& Prinz, 2000; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003). Similarly, the observation of
grasping movements facilitates both the preparation (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi,
& Rizzolatti, 1996) and the execution (Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti,
2002) of congruent responses. These studies suggest that the transformation
of visual inputs into motor predictions applies mostly to coherent postures of
mainly human agents. The literatures suggest that humans orient to grasp-
ing actions performed by another person, but they can ignore actions made
by mechanical devices (Meltzoff, 1995; Castiello, 2003). Likewise, observing
actions performed by humans, but not by robots, interfers with the execution
of these same actions (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Kilner, Hamil-
ton, & Blakemore 2007). An explanation for this might be the agency and the
goal-directedness of the action.
Goal-directedness is defined differently from different authors. According to
the goal-directed theory of imitation (Bekkering, et al., 2000), a goal is defined
as a target for reaching and grasping movements. A goal can be an achievement
(Tomasello, 2000), a mental state (Travis, 1997), or a causal relationship between
an action and its outcome (Dickinson & Balleine, 2000). The common denomi-
nator of these definitions is the underlying concept that only animate organisms
that do things autonomously can have and obtain a goal. Acts performed by
inanimate organisms cannot perform autonomously and their movements are
not considered as goal-directed.
Whereas the literature is straightforward in showing that the observation of
human posture activates the observer’s motor response, it has not yet been
shown whether the same is true for the observer’s attention responses. There-
fore, the aim of this study is to investigate whether the agent’s animacy fa-
cilitates the observer’s orienting of visuospatial attention. In order to comply
with this aim, we compared the responses to the full and precision hand grips
presented adjacent to two identical balls. This hand-ball combination created
two conditons: a goal-directed condition (the hand aperture fitting or ‘grasping’
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the ball) and a non-goal-directed condition (the hand aperture not fitting the
ball), and the same design was adopted for the U-shapes (see Figure 5.1). We
predicted that responses to targets appearing at the hand-object configuration
would benefit from the perceived (attributed) goal-directedness. Targets ap-
pearing at the goal-directed configuration would be faster detected than targest
appearing at the non-goal-directed configuration. Confirming this prediction
would indicate that the nature of the acting agent does indeed facilitate the
observers’ attention.
5.2. Experiment
5.2.1. Methods
Participants
Twenty-six undergraduate psychology students with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and naive to the purpose of the study, took part in the experiment
in exchange of five Euro or credit points.
Stimuli
The stimuli, presented on a computer screen placed 60 cm in front of the par-
ticipants at eye level. The participants were presented with a pair of identical
balls measuring either 1◦ (degrees) or 5◦ in visual angle. The two balls were pre-
sented laterally to the central fixation. The imperative target consisted on the
color change (from yellow to red) of one of the two balls. The primes consisted
in either two mirrored human hands or two mirrored u-shapes. On of the two
hands was a full grip (measuring 10◦ vertically and 12◦ horizontally, with the
inner aperture measuring 5◦) while the other hands depicted a precision grip
(measuring 8◦ vertically, 12◦ horizontally, with the inner aperture measuring
1◦). The U-shape apertures matched the ones of the hands.
The posture-ball combination created four configurations. If the balls were
both large, the full grip aperture appeared at the left of the fixation cross,
and the precision grip aperture appeared at the right of the fixation cross, the
goal-directed configuration corresponded to the left configuration. If balls were
both small, the full grip aperture appeared at the left side, and the precision
grip aperture appeared at the right side of the cross fixation, the goal-directed
configuration corresponded to the right configuration. Targets appearing in
the goal-directed configuration (valid trials) were considered to be primed by
the fitting configuration, whereas the targets appearing in the non-goal-directed
configuration (invalid trials) were considered to be unprimed. The same posture-
ball combination was true for the u-shape condition.
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Figure 5.1.: The figure illustrates the experimental design with Cue Type (animate, inani-
mate) and Object Size (large, small). The star here represents the target onset. In the lower
right part the two objects are presented next to each other. In this design only one posture
’fitted’ the object size; therefore only one posture could ’grasp’ the right size object.
Procedure and design
A typical trial stared with the presentation of a central fixation cross along with
the two lateral balls. After 700 msec, the fixation cross was replaced by a 150-
msec long prime (hands, or u-shapes) followed by the target onset (the change
in colour of one of the two balls). The target appeared 200, 300 or 650 ms after
the prime onset. It remained visible until a response was made or 2500 msec
had elapsed, whichever came first. Participants were randomly assigned to the
hand or the u-shape condition 1. They where told to ignore the aperture of the
hands/u-shapes and fixate at the center of the computer screen. Participants
completed a block of 15 practice trials, followed by block of 180 testing trials, of
which 18 were catch trials (i.e., trials without an imperative target). Catch trials
and the three delay intervals prevented random responses. They responded to
the target onset via a button press.
1The choice for such a between-subjects design was considered more cautious than the within-
subjects design, where a carry-over effect (i.e., the more identifiable primes facilitating the
processing of the following primes, and vice versa the less identifiable primes inhibiting
the processing of the following primes) would have complicated the disentanglement of
animate and inanimate effects.
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Figure 5.2.: Panel 1 illustrates the mean responses to valid and invalid trials as a function
of Cue Type. Panel 2 illustrates the time-course properties of both cues as a function of ISI
and Validity. Only in the hand condition was the cueing benefit (difference between valid and
invalid trials) significant.
5.2.2. Results
Anticipatory responses (e.g., responses ahead of the target onset or within the
first 100 msec of its onset), missing responses (e.g., responses exceeding 800
msec after the target onset), or false alarms (e.g., responses to catch trials)
accounted for less than 2% of all trails and were excluded from the analysis.
The remaining data were submitted into an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
Prime Type (hands, u-shapes) as a between-subjects and Congruency (valid,
invalid trials) as a within-subjects factor (see the left panel in Figure 5.2). The
analysis yielded no main effect for Prime Type F (1, 24) < 1, suggesting that the
overall responses for hands and u-shapes was similar while it did for Validity
F (1, 24) = 4.39, p < .05, suggesting that overall responses to targets in the goal-
directed configuration (340 msec) were faster than responses to targets in the
non-goal-directed configuration (346 msec). Furthermore, Validity interacted
with Prime Type F (1, 24) = 11.54, p < .05, suggesting that the cueing pattern
was contingent on prime type: responses to goal-directed (valid) targets in the
hand condition (346 msec) were faster than responses to non-goal-directed (in-
valid) targets (356 msec) [t(12) = −3.5, p < .05], while this was not the case
for the valid (338 msec) and invalid (337 msec) trials in the u-shape condition
[t(12) < 1].
Considering that the goal-directedness effect was mainly present for the hand
prime, we run an additional post-hoc analysis testing the hand cueing effect
(see the right panel in Figure 5.2). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
ISI and Validity as within-subjects showed an interaction between Validity and
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ISI F (2, 24) = 9.80, p < .05, suggesting that the priming effect tended to rise
already at the shorter ISI 50-msec [t(12) = −2.0, p = .078] interval, reach-
ing its significance level at ISI 150-msec [t(12) = −4.2, p < .01] interval, and
disappearing at the longer ISI 500-msec [t(12) = 1.7, p > .05] interval.
5.3. General Discussion
The present study showed a dissociation of attention as a consequence of ob-
serving goal-directed and non-goal-directed configurations. Targets appearing
next to congruent configurations were facilitated more that the targets appear-
ing next to incongruent configurations. Furthermore, target detection benefited
from the prior presentation (priming) of the hand pictures, but not from the
presentation of the u-shapes. To our knowledge this is the first study providing
evidence on that perceived animacy modulate the observer’s attention.
Interestingly, we saw that the goal-directedness for hand postures occurred
in accordance with the classical stimulus-based interpretation where, in central-
cueing paradigms such as this one, the prime was processed either exogenously:
the prime attracts the observer’s attention toward the region of interests reflex-
ively if the target is presented approximately 100 msec after the prime onset,
and is inhibited if it is presented 500 msec after the prime onset (see Klein &
Taylor, 1994; Posner & Cohen, 1984 for an overview on exogenous and endoge-
nous priming). This exogenous-like processing was illustrated by the finding
that the presentation of the target at short delay intervals (ISI 50 msec and ISI
150 msec) the facilitated the observer’s attention alignment, whereas at long
delay intervals (ISI 500 msec) the observer’s responses were absent. This prim-
ing pattern confirms that the attribution of goal-directedness to other’s actions
modulates the observer’s attention in a reliable and fast manner.
But why some hand-object configurations are perceived as goal-directed while
others are not? One suggestion found in the literature is that hand-object rela-
tions are represented in terms of their functionality or their goal. Infants (Wood-
ward, 1998), preschool children (Bekkering, et al., 2000), and adults (Hommel,
Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) interpret other’s acts in terms of their
goals. Neurophysiological studies support this view by showing that the process
of attributing goal-directedness to other’s actions relies on specific brain areas
that contain a vocabulary of hand actions represented in terms of hand-object
interaction (see Binkofski, Buccino, Posse, Seitz, Rizzolatti, & Freund, 1999;
Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Grezes, Costes, & Decety, 1998).
Goal-directed actions are reinfoirced from daily life interactions, and then inte-
grated into a mnemonic sensory-motor network coding the meaning of the action
(Klatzky, di Pellegrino, McCloskey, & Lederman, 1993). Implausible actions like
that of trying to grasp a bigger-than-the-hand object or using a u-shape object
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to grasp it might not activate the sensory-motor network. In line with this
assumption, our finding showed that inferring the goal of a hand-object config-
uration can be derived from a static hand-object configuration. In fact, seeing
the action itself is not imperative to infer the goal of an action (Johnson-Frey,
Maloof, Newman-Norlund, Farrer, Inati, & Grafton, 2003). Observing a static
finger pointing toward an object facilitates the observers’ visual attention more
conspicuously than observing a dynamic grasping hand because a pointing ac-
tions depics a yet-to-be-performed action, and this inferential process affects the
visual orienting (Fischer & Szymkowiak, 2004).
In addition to being represented in our mnemonic system, another’s actions
are reflexively simulated (see Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). Actions mappable-
onto-our-body are mentally simulated. Thus, while intentional behavior (e.g.,
reaching, grasping, manipulating) occurs as the output of a decision-making pro-
cess, part of the behavior-organizing processes occurs exogenously: the sight of
a human action activates the motor system underlying that representation. The
simulation proposal is supported by infant (Meltzoff, 1995) as well as adult (Kil-
ner, et. al., 2003; Kilner, et al., 2007; Blakemore & Frith, 2005) studies showing
that movements performed by mechanical devices, such as robot arms, do not
interf with the observer’s motor behavior while human movements modulate the
observer’s behaviour. Our findings add to this literature by showing that even
in a paradigm where no motor prerequisites are required we can measure at an
attentional level the differential process of human and non-human actions.
The alignment of one’s attention as a consequence of observing another con-
specific’s goal-directed actions is highly relevance for human interaction. Hu-
mans determine the conspecfic’s region of interest by aligning their attention
with the other’s gaze (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Hietanen, 1999; Langton,
et al., 2000; Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, & Ngan, 2004) or hand (Fischer &
Szymkowiak, 2004) actions. According to Tomasello’s (2004) joint attention
process humans rely on information derived from observing other’s social signal
such as gaze or hand postures. However, in an earlier study (Nuku & Bekkering,
in press) we investigated whether the observers align their attention with the
agent’s gaze direction or whether they attend at the agent’s region of interest.
We showed that responses to targets primed by an agent with the gaze direc-
tion occluded with non-transparent sunglasses facilitated target detection while
observing the same agent with the gaze direction occluded by non-transparent
occluders did not trigger the observer’s attention. Not surprisingly that this
finding is confirmed by the current study showing that it is not the hand pos-
ture per se, but the action attributed to it that attracts the observer’s attention.
That is why future investigations on how the human motor systems responds
to other human actions, should consider capturing the observer’s attentional
processing, since attention modulation is a good indicator of the the observer’s
action-understanding process.
70
5.3. General Discussion
In conclusion, this study showed that actions performed by humans modulate
the observer’s attention while alternative non-human stimuli do not. We found
that the attentional modulation resulting from observing human hands is not
merely perceptual in nature, but rather it relies on the human ability to attribute
goal-directedness to other’s actions. Putting them together, these two findings
suggest that attributing goals to others’ actions is a reflexive process that, even
in the absence of a motor prerequisite, modulates the observers’ attention at an
early level.
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6.1. Gaze and hand signals in social cognition
Social cognition encompasses the cognitive processes relevant to the understand-
ing of the actions performed by conspecifics, by means of mind reading (Adolphs,
1999). Not only the observable, but the unobservable too can be understood:
one learns where the other focusses her attention and infers what the others
intend to do (Frith & Frith, 2006). This way one predicts another’s actions
by attributing it to goals, intentions, and beliefs (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994).
This implicit communication relies on the ability to exchange social signals, an
activity that starts in early infancy. Newborns first engage their gaze with an-
other’s (mutual) gaze, but latter on they monitor and orient with the others’
averted gaze. In the ‘joint attention’ stage, gaze becomes a social signal. The
infants know that the other’s focus of attention is on a gazed object, and that
the other’s gaze direction is not the goal of the comunication. Gaze becomes a
reliable social signal in the ‘shared attention’ stage where both agents are aware
of each-other’s focus of attention. This implicit communication is further re-
fined in the‘theory of mind’ stage where the two agents attribute mental states
and intentions to each-other’s gaze. This thesis investigated this latter phase
of signal exchange, showing that social signals are fast processed, and that the
process affects (facilitates) the observer’s attention. It showed that the inferring
of another’s attended region of interest affects the observer’s spatial attention in
a similar way to that of aligning one’s own gaze with the direction of another’s
eye direction.
Whereas this thesis (Chapter 2, Experiment 1) confirmed the already well-
established reflexive visuospatial attention, it additionally showed (Chapter 2,
Experiment 2) that such attention deployement can also be derived from in-
ferences. When another’s gaze is obstructed but one has grounds to assume
that the other can still attend, the alignment of the observer’s attention with
the other’s inferred region of interest can be facilitated. This novel finding was
confirmed in the following study (see Chapter 3), where attentional modulation
relying on inferential (top-down) rather than perceptual (bottom-up) mecha-
nisms were empirically evidenced in a crossmodal modality. Here, observing
another agent looking toward a specific location did facilitate the detection of
sounds appearing at that (gazed) location. Sounds propagating from the gazed
location where detected significantly faster than sounds propagating from the
non-gazed location. More interestingly, we showed (Chapter 3, Experiment 3)
that when the agent’s eyes were closed, the sounds propagating from the agent’s
ear side were detected faster than the sounds propagating from the agent’s eyes
side. This novel finding is crucial to confirm our hypothesis that deliberate
processing of the stimuli affects the observer’s attention. First of all these find-
ings are in line with the crossmodal orienting literature, showing that stimuli in
one modality do enhance the processing of stimuli in another modality (Spence
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& Driver 1997; Driver, & Spence 1998; McDonald et al. 2000; Bolognini et
al., 2005; Mazza et al., 2006). Differently form this literature, we showed that
participants aligned their attention with the sound location by assuming the
agent as auditorily attending to it. We showed that when an agent cannot see
she can still hear, and that assuming this activates the observer’s alertness. It
seems that one’s attention is not only modulated by the mere alignment with
another’s eyes, but also by processing the intentions contained and represented
by these social signals.
Whereas neither the gazer not the observer are aware that they influence
each other with their gaze, sometimes another person’s gaze tells more than just
direction. This holds true for hand signals too. As earlier said, according to
the social cognitive model of joint attention, humans represent the other’s goals
in terms of action intention (Tomasello, et al., 2005). When one observes the
actions of other people one makes implicit inferences about the intentions and
goals associated with these movements (Wolpert et al. 2003). With regard to
hand postures, a large body of works shows that human communication involves
the activation of motor systems in the brain, and this system allows in the
observer an internal action simulation (Frith & Wolpert, 2003). Seeing a human
hand grasping a target prompts the observer to represent the agent’s motor
intention by matching the perceived movement onto her own motor repertoire.
Interestingly, humans do not need to see the action since they attribute mental
states to depictions of actions too. A static image of hand postures implying
a grasping action does affect the observer’s attention (Fischer, Prinz, & Lotz,
2007), and comparison to dynamis actions, static depiction of actions shows
a stronger visuo-motor priming effect (Stu¨rmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000),
suggesting that humans inferr the goal of the action even when the action itself
is physically absent.
Similarly to the first part, where we treated the gaze cueing effect, the second
part of the thesis investigated the role of hand postures in attention orienting.
In line with other studies showing that gaze cues, body orientation, and deictic
pointing are crucial to joint attention (Langton et al., 2000) this thesis showed
that observers infer the goal of another person’s grasping action from the shape
of the hand, and from the hand-object configuration. We showed (see Chapter
4) that human hands presented near a fitting object, creating thus hand-object
compatibility, facilitated the observer’s attention more strongly than when the
hand did not fit the object. Interestingly, this cueing pattern was not present
for the innanimate agent, suggesting that the human component (e.g., animacy)
of a signal is crucial for triggering another’s attention.
According to a series of experiments by Castiello and colleagues (Castiello,
Lusher, Mari, Edwards & Humphreys, 2002) grasping movements are affected by
prior observation of a human grasping the object but not by the prior observation
of a robotic hand/arm performing the same tasks. Similarly, Kilner, Paulignan
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& Blakemore (2003) showed that of the observer’s arm movemtents was subject
to interference from the simultaneous observation of another person performing
an arm movement, but not by the observation of a robot (arm) performing the
same movement (but see Press, Bird, Flach & Heyes 2005, for an explanation
based on general associative learning principles). The crucial role of ‘animacy’ is
supported also by neurophysiological studies suggesting the existence of specific
brain areas (e.g., the STS) involved in both the detection of human motion and
the inferring of the action intentions (for a review, see Allison et al., 2000).
In addition to the role of animacy in triggering attention, the study showed
that the human hand alone is not sufficient to trigger the observer’s attention.
Only when the hand posture could plausibly grasp the adjacent object was
the observer’s attention attracted. When the object did not fit the hand, the
animacy component of the hand was not sufficient to facilitate the observer’s
attention. Thus, in the following study (Chapter 5) we investigated the role of
hand postures even further. Considering that actions are processed in terms of
their anticipated sensory consequences (Greenwald, 1970) and that understand-
ing another’s actions does (partially) consist in inferring other’s action intentions
(Stock & Stock, 2004), we ran a study where the inferential processes would be
needed in order to comply with the task. Here, the object appearing near the
hand posturte moved, seemingly as a consequence of the hand action. This
manipulation showed that anticipating the functional relationship between the
manipulator (hand) and a manipulated object affect the observer’s attention.
Although target motion (low-level perceptual processing) might have played a
role, this study showed that high-level cognitive processes, inferring other’s ac-
tion goals, did affect the observer’s visual attention.
6.2. Conclusions
In this thesis, we have drawn together findings that highlight the importance of
social signals in understanding other’s intentions and detecting their region of
interest. It showed that these signals act as gatekeepers for learning about the
world from other people. The evidence discussed suggests that the processing of
these signals is crucial for creating a shared social world where humans are able
to recognise an intentional action and aling to it. It is unimportant whether we
face another’s gaze or hand posture, because humans focus on the unobservable
intentions carried by these signals. This thesis excludes that predicting other’s
intentions, communications and feelings might be a working model, rather than
a true reflection of the other person’s mental states. However, it provides a
starting point for developing new experiments in the area of social cognition.
Social signals are the gateway to one’s attention, and one’s attention is the
ingress to one’s intention. This way another’s attention tells not only where one
is orienting, but also why one is doing so.
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Eyeing and grasping the other’s
intentions: when inferring
another’s acts affects our own
attention
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee (experimentele) delen. Het eerste deel (hoofd-
stuk 1 en 2) behandelt de rol van kijkrichting (‘gaze’) in het verwerven van
menselijke intenties. Dit deel toont aan dat het detecteren van een doel gefacili-
teerd wordt door twee mechanismen: het observeren van iemands kijkrichting
en het herleiden van iemands aandachtsfocus. Het tweede deel van de thesis
(hoofdstuk 3 en 4) bestaat uit studies waarin onderzocht wordt of het waarne-
men van de houding van de hand de aandacht van de waarnemer faciliteert. De
studies uit dit deel laten zien dat waarnemers niet enkel de richting van de houd-
ing volgen, maar dat zij ook het doel van de waargenomen houding anticiperen
en herleiden. Het laatste deel van dit proefschrift integreert de bevindingen en
bespreekt ze in het kader van sociale cognitie.
Deel 1
Joint attention: herleiden wat anderen waarnemen (en niet
waarnemen)
Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat waarnemers automatisch hun aandacht op de
kijkrichting van iemand richten. De studies in dit eerste deel onderzoeken of het
herleiden van de locatie waarop iemand zijn of haar aandacht richt, de aandacht
van de waarnemer be¨ınvloedt. In twee experimenten keken proefpersonen naar
het zijprofiel van een menselijk gezicht (‘agent’). De orie¨ntatie van het gezicht
diende als aanwijzing voor e´e´n van de twee mogelijke doelen. In Experiment 1
waren de ogen van de agent open of dicht (zie Figuur 2.1). In Experiment 2
waren de ogen van de agent onzichtbaar gemaakt door middel van een zonnebril
of een balk (zie Figuur 2.3). In beide experimenten moesten de proefpersonen
het doel, een rood balletje dat ofwel naast het gezicht ofwel aan de andere kant
verscheen, zo snel mogelijk detecteren.
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De resultaten van Experiment 1 toonden aan dat proefpersonen het doel
sneller konden detecteren als zij naar de agent met geopende ogen keken dan
naar de agent met gesloten ogen (zie Figuur 2.2). Experiment 2 liet vergelijkbare
resultaten zien. Proefpersonen konden hun aandacht beter sturen wanneer de
agent een zonnebril ophad dan wanneer de ogen van de agent onzichtbaar waren
gemaakt door een balk (zie Figuur 2.4). Samen toonden deze experimenten aan
dat het observeren van de orie¨ntatie van een gezicht wel belangrijk is, maar niet
voldoende om de aandacht van een waarnemer effectief te sturen. Mensen maken
vooral gebruik van de kijkrichting van de ander om hieruit de doellocatie af te
leiden en zodoende het sturen van de aandacht te faciliteren. Daarnaast werd
aangetoond dat het richten van de aandacht ook gefaciliteerd werd wanneer de
kijkrichting niet direct waarneembaar, maar wel te herleiden en dus zinvol was.
Wanneer iemand ziet wat de ander hoort: Crossmodale modulatie
van de aandacht
Drie experimenten onderzochten de rol van crossmodale cueing in een “waarne-
mer - agent - object”-situatie. Deelnemers aan deze experimenten moesten een
auditief doel (een toon) detecteren. De orie¨ntatie (links of rechts) van het gezicht
(agent) kon een aanwijzing zijn voor het doel. De agent had ofwel de ogen open
of dicht (zie Figuur 3.1). De toon werd in de helft van de trials via een linker
luidspreker aangeboden en in de andere helft via een rechter luidspreker.
Het eerste experiment toonde aan dat wanneer de ogen van de agent geopend
waren, de geluiden die aan de kant van de ogen van de agent (“oogzijde”) werden
gepresenteerd sneller werden gedetecteerd dan de geluiden die aan de andere kant
werden gepresenteerd. Echter, wanneer de ogen van de agent gesloten waren,
konden proefpersonen de geluiden die aan de oorzijde werden gepresenteerd
sneller detecteren dan de geluiden die aan de oogzijde werden gepresenteerd
(zie Figuur 3.2). Om verder te onderzoeken of het oor zelf van invloed was
op facilitatie van de aandacht, werd Experiment 2 uitgevoerd. Aanname van
dit experiment was dat het effect van “oorzijde” zou verdwijnen als de agent
geen oor had. De taak voor de proefpersonen was hetzelfde als in het eerste
experiment. In de helft van de trials diende de orie¨ntatie van het gezicht (ogen
open of ogen gesloten, maar dan zonder oren) als aanwijzing voor het auditieve
doel (zie Figuur 3.3). Het experiment repliceerde het faciliterende effect van
“oogzijde” in de situatie waarin de agent zijn ogen open had. In tegenstelling
tot Experiment 1, liet dit experiment echter geen effect van “oorzijde” meer
zien (zie Figuur 3.4). Deze twee experimenten suggereren dat het cueing effect
functioneel is, maar sluiten een spatiele verklaring (de geringe afstand tussen
oog/oor en geluid) niet uit. Om een spatiele verklaring uit te sluiten werd
een derde experiment uitgevoerd. Hierin werd het oor onzichtbaar gemaakt
door middel van een helm, dat normaal geen geluid doorlaat, of een hoed, die
90
Nederlandse samenvatting
wel geluid doorlaat (zie Figuur 3.5). Als het cueing effect in Experiment 1 het
resultaat was van het zien van het oor, zou dit experiment in beide situaties geen
effect gevonden worden. Maar, als het cueing effect in Experiment 1 het resultaat
was van de functionaliteit van het oor (geluiden horen), dan zou alleen een cueing
effect verwacht worden in de conditie waarin de agent een hoed droeg en niet
wanneer de agent een help op had. De resultaten waren in overeenstemming
met een functionele verklaring: Een cueing effect werd alleen gevonden in de
hoed-conditie. Deze studie laat zien dat het direct observeren van iemands oren
of ogen belangrijk is, maar zeker niet essentieel voor het richten van de aandacht
van de waarnemer. Daarnaast liet de studie zien dat het richten van de aandacht
geen gevolg is van de verwerking van spatiele informatie, maar van de verwerking
van functionele informatie. Het doel hiervan is anticiperen op en actief herleiden
van iemands intenties.
Deel 2
Joint attention in actie observatie: herleiden van iemands hand
acties faciliteert de aandacht van de waarnemer
Het observeren van menselijke acties heeft gevolgen voor de visuele orie¨ntatie
van een kijker. Deze studie onderzocht de perceptuele en cognitieve mecha-
nismen achter deze “joint-attention” effect. In drie afzonderlijke experimenten
kregen de deelnemers twee hand houdingen te zien: een hand met een wijzende
vinger (wijzen) en een hand die grijpt (grijpen) hand. Deze houdingen van de
hand waren juist gericht op een van de drie objecten (kopjes) op een virtuele
tafel of juist van een van de objecten af gericht. De reactietijden nodig voor
het detecteren van een visueel doel (een zwarte cirkel op een van de drie ob-
jecten) werden geregistreerd, door middel van een knopdruk. De eerste twee
experimenten (zie Figuur 4.1 en Figuur 4.3) ondersteunden de perceptuele hy-
pothese: deelnemers waren sneller om een target te detecteren als de houding
van de hand een directe aanwijzing vormde voor de doel locatie (zie Figuur 4.2
& Figuur 4.4). In het laatste experiment (zie Figuur 4.5) moesten de deelnemers
de beweging van het object detecteren. Dit experiment bevestigde de cognitieve
hypothese. Volgens deze hypothese profiteert “joint attention” van cognitieve
processen, zoals het herleiden en interpreteren van acties tussen de handgreep
en het object op een causale mannier.
De drie experimenten tonden aan dat het waarnemen van iemands handgreep
de aandacht stuurt. Ook laten de experimenten zien dat het herleiden van een
functioneel (causale) verband tussen een manipulator (hand) en een gemanipu-
leerd object (kopje) de aandacht kan be¨ınvloeden.
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Het begrijpen van de bedoeling van iemand anders: de vastberaden
acties trekken aandacht aan
Menselijke acties veroorzaken een transformatie in de visuele input van de
observer. In dit experiment werd onderzocht of het herleiden van het doel
van een bepaalde handgreep kan de visuo-spatiele aandacht van de waarne-
mer be¨ınvloeden. In een simpele detectie taak reageerden de deelnemers op
de presentatie van een visueel doel (een rood gekleurde bal). Twee geel gek-
leurde ballen werden gepresenteerd naast de twee verschillende handgrepen (een
volledige greep of een precisie greep) of naast twee U-vormige figuren die als sym-
bolische representatie van de handgrepen dienden. De proefpersonen moesten
een knop indrukken als het doel (rode bal) verscheen. De resultaten lieten zien
dat proefpersonen reageerden sneller op een doelgerichte configuratie (d.w.z.,
op de trials waarin het doel verscheen op het balletje dat in overeenstemming
was met de handgreep) dan op een niet-doelgerichte configuratie (d.w.z., het
doel verscheen op het balletje dat niet in overeenstemming was met de hand-
greep). De doelgerichte configuratie faciliteert blijkbaar de visuele orie¨ntatie
van de proefpersonen. Voorts toonde dit experiment aan dat het effect van
doelgerichtheid niet aanwezig was voor de U-vormige figuur (zie Figuur 5.2).
De huidige studie toonde een scheiding van de aandacht ten gevolge van het
waarnemen van doelgerichte en niet-doelgerichte configuraties. De target die
verschenen naast overeenstemmende configuraties werden meer vergemakkelijkt
die de targets die naast incongruente configuraties verschenen. Voorts profi-
teerde de target detection van de vroegere presentatie van de menselijke hand,
maar niet van de presentatie van de niet-menselijke U-vorm. Met andere woor-
den de doelgerichtheid van iemands lichaamshoudingen en animacy (menselijk
attribuut) zijn twee kritische componenten van het proces van het moduleren
van iemands e aandacht.
Conclusie
Dit proefschrift laat het belang van sociale signalen in het begrijpen van mense-
lijke intenties zien en benadrukt dat mensen voortdurend aan het zoeken zijn
naar andermans acties. De studies in dit proefschrift tonen aan dat kijkrichting
en handgrepen een belangrijke rol spelen in deze processen. De verwerking
van deze informatie is essentieel voor menselijke communicatie, maar het is
niet nodig om iemands kijkrichting of handgreep daadwerkelijk waar te kunnen
nemen, aangezien mensen zich ook op de onwaarneembare bedoelingen van deze
signalen concentreren. Deze studie kan niet uitsluiten dat het voorspellen van
andermans intenties, gevoelens, of acties, slechts een model is eerder dan een
weerspiegeling van de ‘state of mind’ van andere mensen. Desondanks verstrekt
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dit werk een uitgangspunt voor het ontwikkelen van nieuwe paradigma’s op het
gebied van social cognition, waar tegelijkertijd met de vraag ‘waar op mensen
zich orie¨nteren’ de vraag ‘waarom mensen zich daar naartoe orie¨nteren’ gesteld
moet worden. Een sociaal signaal is een poort naar iemands aandacht, maar de
aandacht zelf is de poort naar de menselijke intenties.
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Te hamendurit ndikon ve¨mendjen
e ve¨shtruesit dhe nxjerr ne¨ pah
qe¨llimet e tija
Ne¨ literature¨n shkencore e¨shte¨ ve¨rtetuar qe¨ ne¨se dikush ve¨zhgon veprimet e
nje¨ tjetrit, ve¨zhguesi e¨shte¨ i prirur te¨ imitoje¨, vetvetiu pa vete¨dije e padashur,
veprimet e ve¨zhguara. Pe¨rkimi mes veprimit te¨ ve¨zhguar dhe veprimit te¨ kryer
nga vete¨ ve¨zhguesi e¨shte¨ thelbi i bashke¨veprimit njere¨zor. Ky studim synon te¨
tregoje¨ qe¨ jo vete¨m kur ve¨zhgojne¨ por edhe kur hamendojme¨ (marrim me mend)
veprimet e tjere¨ve, njere¨zit i pe¨rshtaten vetvetiut veprimeve te¨ hamenduara nga
vete¨ ato. Pra ve¨zhguesit jo vete¨m jane¨ te¨ ndjeshe¨m kundrejt veprimeve te¨
ve¨zhguara po edhe kundrejt veprimeve te¨ qe¨ ato vete¨ mendon si te¨ ve¨rteta.
Ne¨ pjese¨n en pare te teze¨s trajtohet roli qe ve¨zhgimi i syve te¨ nje personi
ka tek ve¨zhguesi. Gjithashtu trajtohen mekanizmat qe¨ shtyjne¨ ve¨zhguesin te¨
hamendojne¨ qe¨ dikush sheh, edhe kur syte¨ e ke¨tij te¨ fundit jane¨ te¨ fshehur e te¨
padukshe¨m pe¨r ve¨zhguesin.
Ne¨ dy eksperimente i tregojme¨ ve¨zhuesve (pjesmarre¨sve ne¨ ke¨te¨ eksperiment)
nje¨ fytyre¨ ne¨ profilt te¨ drejtuara ose nga e majta ose nga e djathta. Ne¨ eksperi-
mentin e pare¨ ne¨ gjysmen e rasteve fytyra i kishte syte¨ e hapur, nde¨rsa ne¨ gjys-
men e sprovave te¨ mbetura, syte¨ ishin te¨ mbyllur. Ve¨zhguesit kishin pe¨r detyre¨
te¨ shtypnin nje¨ buton sapo nje¨ objekt paraqitej ne¨ te¨ majte¨ ose ne¨ te¨ djathte¨
te¨ fytyre¨s. Ky eksperiment tregoi qe¨ vete¨m fytyra me syte¨ e hapur te¨rhoqi
ve¨mendjen e ve¨zhguesve drejt objektit. Fytyra me syte¨ e mbyllur nuk te¨rhoqi
ve¨me¨ndjen e ve¨zhguesve. Ne¨ eksperimentin e dyte¨ hetuam ne¨se hamendimi
(dhe jo ve¨zhgimi direkt!) i syve mund te¨ zhve¨ndose¨ ve¨me¨ndjen e ve¨zhguesit
drejt objektit. Ne¨ ke¨te¨ eksperiment pjesmarre¨sit pane te¨ nje¨jte¨n fytyre¨ si me¨
pare por tani ne¨ gjysme¨n e rasteve fytyra mbante syze (jo te¨ tejdukshe¨m) dhe
ne¨ gjysme¨n tjete¨r te¨ rasteve fytyra kishte syte¨ e mbuluar nga nje¨ pllake¨ (jo
e tejdukshme). Pra, ne¨ te¨ dyja rastet syte¨ e fytyre¨s ishin te¨ padukshe¨m pe¨r
ve¨zhguesin. Ky eksperiment tregoi qe¨ kur pje¨smarre¨sit ve¨zhguan fytyre¨n me
syze, ve¨mendja e tyre u zhvendos ashtu sin e exkperimentin e pare kur fytura
i kishte syte e hapur, ndersa ve¨zhgimi i fytyres me syte¨ e bllokuar nga pllaka
nuk zhve¨ndosin ve¨me¨ndjen e pjesmarre¨sve. Pra, megjithe¨se¨ ne¨ te¨ dy rastet syte¨
ishin te¨ padukshe¨m, pjesmarre¨sit ishin me¨ te¨ ndjeshe¨m ndaj fytyre¨s me¨ syze
sesa nga fytyra me pllake¨. Sipas ke¨tij studimi si ne¨ rastin kur ve¨zhgojme¨ drej-
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timin e syve te¨ dikujt tjete¨r ashtu edhe ne¨ rastin kur hamendojme drejtimin e
tyre, ve¨me¨ndja e ve¨zhguesit ndikohet thelbe¨sisht. Intersant ke¨tu e¨shte¨ fakti qe¨
pe¨rfytyrimi i akteve te¨ dikujt tjete¨r ka ne¨ ve¨mendjen e njere¨zve.
Ky efekt u pe¨rforcua nga nje¨ studim tjete¨r i cili studioi ne¨se i nje¨jti efekt do te¨
shfaqej ne¨se objekti i paraqitur nuk do te¨ ishte visual por auditiv, pra nje¨ tingull.
Pyetja ke¨tu ishte ne¨se ve¨zhgimi dhe hamendimi i drejtimit te¨ ve¨mendjes (syve)
te¨ dikujt tjete¨r ndikon ne¨ ve¨mendjen e ve¨zhguesit. A e¨shte¨ e mundur qe¨ ve¨zhgimi
i syve drejt nje¨ burimit te¨ nje¨ tingulli te¨ ndikoje¨ ve¨mendjen e ve¨zhguesit? Tre
eksperimente te reja pohuan ke¨te¨ pyetje e treguan qe¨ ve¨zhgimi fytyre¨s me syte¨ e
hapur ndikoi ne¨ ve¨mendjen e ve¨zhguesit me¨ shume¨ sesa fytyra me syte¨ e mbyllur.
Pe¨r me¨ tepe¨r ke¨to tre eksperimente treguan qe¨ te¨ hamenduarit te¨ drejtimit te¨
ve¨zhgimit pati te¨ nje¨tin efekt si ai i te¨ ve¨zhguarit.
Ne¨ pjese¨n e dyte¨ trajtohet roli qe¨ ve¨zhgimi i duarve te¨ ka tek ve¨zhguesi.
Studime te¨ ndryshme (neuro)psikologjike kane¨ treguar qe¨ truri i njeriut pe¨rdor
te¨ nje¨jtat mekanizma e stuktura pe¨r te¨ filluar nje¨ le¨vizje ashtu edhe per te¨
kuptuar te¨ nje¨te¨n le¨vizje tek nje¨ personit tjete¨r. Nje¨ faktor i re¨nde¨sishe¨m pe¨r
ke¨te¨ mekanizm e¨shte¨ koncepti gjallese¨: nde¨rsa veprimet e gjallesave (njere¨zve ne¨
pe¨rgjithe¨si) konsiderohen te¨ mbartin qe¨llime; veprimet jo njere¨zore, si ne¨ rastin
e roboteve¨, nuk konsiderohen si te¨ tilla megjithe¨se ke¨to te¨ fundit be¨jne¨ te¨ nje¨te¨n
le¨vizje si nje¨rzit.
Ne¨ dy studime te¨ ndryshme ne hetuam ne¨se koncepti ‘gjallese¨’ ndikon ne¨
zhve¨ndosjen e ve¨me¨ndjes se¨ ve¨zhguesit kur ve¨zhguesi ballafaqohet me nje¨ veprimi
te¨ kryer nga nje¨ njeri dhe nje¨ veprimi te¨ kryer nga nje¨ agjent i pajete¨ (robot). Ne¨
studimin e pare¨ ve¨zhguesit pane nje¨ dore¨ njeriu e cila dukej sikur po kapte nje¨
objekt. Gjithashtu ato pane nje¨ forme¨ qe¨ i she¨mbe¨llente dore¨s, por qe¨ nuk kishte
asgje¨ tjete¨r te¨ pe¨rbashke¨t me dore¨n, e cila dukej sikur po kapte te¨ nje¨tin objekt.
Vete¨m kur pjesmarre¨sit ve¨shtruan dore¨n njere¨zore ve¨me¨ndja e tyre u ndikua
(te¨rhoq) drejt objektit. Dora e rreme¨ nuk ndikoi ne¨ ve¨me¨ndjen e ve¨zhguesve.
Ky studim tregoi qe¨ koncepti gjallese¨ ndikon jo vete¨m ne¨ sistemin motorik (pra,
te¨ le¨vizurit) te¨ ve¨zhguesit por edhe ne¨ sistemin me¨ te¨ hershe¨m atentiv (pra, te¨
ve¨me¨ndjes).
Ne¨ studimin tjeter ne treguam qe¨ kur nje¨ dore¨ paraqitej ne¨ afe¨rsi te¨ nje¨ ob-
jekti i cili nje¨kohesisht leviz ne drejtim te¨ dores jo si pasoje¨ e dore¨s por vetvetiu,
ve¨zhguesit ishim me¨ te¨ gatshe¨m te¨ interpretonin dore¨n si shkak te¨ le¨vizjes se¨ ob-
jektit. Ne¨se objekti le¨vizte ne¨ drejtimn te¨ kunde¨rt me dore¨n, ve¨zhguesit nuk e
interpretonin ke¨te¨ le¨vizje si rrjedhoje¨ te¨ dore¨s, dhe ve¨mendja e tyre nuk te¨rhiqej
nga le¨vizja e objektit. Kjo pjese¨ e teze¨s tregon qe¨ ne¨se nje¨ agjent interpretohet
si i gjalle¨, apo njere¨zor, dhe ne¨se ve¨zhguesi hamendon nje¨ qe¨llim kundrejt dore¨s,
ve¨me¨ndja e ve¨zhguesit lehte¨sohet e drejtohet me¨ shume¨ sesa kur dora nuk eshte
njerezore e sesa kur ve¨zhguesi nuk sheh qe¨llim ne¨ ate¨ le¨vizje. Eshte¨ e re¨nde¨sishme
te¨ kujtojme¨ ke¨tu qe¨ vetite¨ e hamendimit jane¨ te¨ njohura ne¨ literature¨n shkencore
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pe¨rsa i pe¨rket sistemit motorik por jo atij atentiv (ve¨me¨ndjes). Ke¨to eksperi-
mente tregojne pe¨r here¨ te pare¨ qe¨ sistemi atentiv i ve¨zhguesit influencohet nga
qe¨llimet qe¨ ve¨zhguesi i ngarkohen veprimeve njere¨zore.
Kjo teze¨ tregon qe¨ ve¨me¨ndja e njere¨zve ndikohet jo vete¨m nga ve¨zhgimi i nje¨
aktit por edhe nga hamendja e qe¨llimeve pas ke¨tyre akteve. Njere¨zit jane¨ te¨
prirur te¨ interpretojne¨ veprimet e te¨ tjere¨ve. Ky intrepretim e¨shte¨ i dukshem
e mund te¨ konkretizohet duke matur zhvendosjen e ve¨me¨ndjes se¨ ve¨zhguesit.
Ve¨mendja njere¨zore e¨shte¨ nje¨ porte¨ drejt ke¨tyre qe¨llimeve qelimeve njerezore, e
qe¨llimet ndikojne ve¨mendjen.
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